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 To my Father 
and to all people that are still able to invest in men 
for the improvement of the society 
  
…migliaia, milioni di individui lavorano, producono e risparmiano  
nonostante tutto quello che noi possiamo inventare per molestarli, incepparli, 
scoraggiarli. 
È la vocazione naturale che li spinge; non soltanto la sete di denaro. 
Il gusto, l’orgoglio di vedere la propria azienda prosperare, acquistare credito,  
ispirare fiducia a clientele sempre più vaste, ampliare gli impianti, abbellire le sedi, 
costituiscono una molla di progresso altrettanto potente che il guadagno. 
Se così non fosse, non si spiegherebbe come ci siano imprenditori che nella propria 
azienda prodigano tutte le loro energie e investono tutti i loro capitali per ritrarre 
spesso utili di gran lunga più modesti di quelli che potrebbero sicuramente e 
comodamente con altri impieghi. 
 
Luigi Einaudi 
Secondo presidente della Repubblica Italiana 
 
…thousands, millions of people work, produce and save  
despite all that can be invented to obstruct, bother and discourage them. 
It is a natural vocation that drives them, not only the thirst for money. 
The pleasure, the pride of seeing its own company prospering, 
becoming trustworthy, inspiring confidence in ever wider clientele,  
expanding plants, enriching their workplaces, 
are a spring in progress as powerful as profit. 
Otherwise, there would not be any reason why there are entrepreneurs  
who dedicate all their energies in their company 
 and invest all their money to generate profits often far more modest  
than those they could definitely and easily get through other investments. 
 
Luigi Einaudi 
Second President of the Italian Republic 
I 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 
A major research project like this is never the work of the author alone. The 
contributions of many different people, in their different ways, have made this 
possible. I would like to extend my appreciation especially to the following. 
Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. 
Bianchi for the continuous support of my Ph.D study and research, his 
perseverance and motivation that he conveyed to me during my research 
activity. He has also provided me with an excellent atmosphere for doing 
research and the possibility to study and measure myself with an international 
research context. 
Besides, I would like to thank the rest of professors and researchers involved in 
the activities of the Business Management school of the University of Palermo: 
Prof. Ruisi, Prof. Bivona, Dr. Cosenz, Dr. Paternostro, as well as Prof. Coda 
from University Luigi Bocconi who has inspired many ideas of the present 
work. 
I cannot forget to thank for their support all professors and researchers met 
during my research period abroad at the Universities of Bergen and Nijmegen, 
and in particular: Prof. Davidsen, Prof. Moxnes, Prof. Wheat, Prof. Vennix, 
Prof. Grossler and Dr. Rouwette. 
Finally, I take this opportunity to express profound gratitude to my parents for 
their courageous life’s example, my eight brothers and sisters and in particular 
Antonio, Giorgio, Andrea and Giulia, my PhD colleagues Federico, Lidia and 
Francesca who have been also fantastic life’s companions, my brother-in-law 
Marco and my good friends met during these three years, and in particular 
Victor, Milica and Vanessa who have supported me during my research 
activity. 
Last but not the least, I would like to thank my great friends Tommaso, Salvo, 
Giuseppe and Pablo for their great friendship and support in all moments of my 
life. 
II 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.  FROM THE “GLASS BELL” TO  THE PROBLEM  AWARENESS .................. 6 
1.1 A problem of managerial culture or of State organization’s vision and 
strategy? ................................................................................................................... 6 
1.2.   A shift of game’s rules in State organization’s strategizing .......................... 15 
1.3 The phenomenon of “strategic asset-seeking” relocation ................................ 18 
2.  THE ITALIAN STATE’S PLANNING AND CONTROL AND THE ISSUE 
OF PUBLIC POLICIES’ EVALUATION ................................................................ 26 
2.1. The Italian State’s programming cycle and the coordination among different 
levels of public governance .................................................................................... 26 
2.2. Contents of the Measures of Public Finance ................................................... 28 
2.3. Main criticalities of Italian State’s programming cycle .................................. 32 
2.3.1. The lack of evaluation of the policy adopted for the program realization 32 
2.3.2. The lack of evaluation of the complex of policies in force on the specific 
sectors ................................................................................................................. 34 
2.3.3. Policy’s spatial horizon still focused within national boundaries ............ 35 
2.3.4. Vision oriented to inputs and not to the development of State’s strategic 
assets ................................................................................................................... 36 
2.3.5. Ways by which budget allocation’s decisions are taken (issue common 
to most democracies). ......................................................................................... 39 
2.4. A recent example of State policy’s failure in Italy .......................................... 41 
III 
 
3.  THE MODEL ........................................................................................................ 45 
3.1.  Beyond the public policies’ criticalities: enhancing the performance 
management systems through computer aided simulation models. The System 
dynamics methodology. ......................................................................................... 45 
3.2 The Dynamic problem ...................................................................................... 47 
3.3. The Dynamic hypothesis ................................................................................. 51 
3.3.1. The Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) ............................................................ 51 
3.3.2. The Stock and Flow diagram (SFD) ......................................................... 53 
3.4. Model analysis ................................................................................................. 63 
3.5. Italian State’s net tax income performance ..................................................... 78 
3.6.  Insights from model’s results ......................................................................... 81 
4.  BEYOND THE STATE ORGANIZATION FINANCIAL STRATEGY: THE 
CONCEPT OF HOLISTIC DEVELOPMENT FOR A SUSTAINABLE STATE – 
TERRITORY STRATEGIZING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT ...... 82 
4.1.  Introducing the concept of holistic development in “Azienda Italia”. ........... 82 
4.2 Quantitative results from the implementation of a holistic development 
strategy ................................................................................................................... 90 
4.3 The effects of “holistic development” strategies on Social capital growth to 
the benefit of Italy’s global competitiveness. ......................................................... 95 
5. CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .............. 100 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 106 
APPENDIX A – List of model’s equations ............................................................. 113 
APPENDIX B -  The model ..................................................................................... 119 
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In most of the countries a prevalent juridical and bureaucratic perspective in 
administrating public organizations has prevented to consider them as performance 
oriented organizations, based on a mission and subjected to an efficient and 
effective relationship between resources employed and results delivered. 
Nevertheless, as suggested by the Italian culture of business management, all the 
business features are also traceable in State organization (Bruni 1999, Sorci 2002).  
The current financial crisis asks for a greater awareness of public 
organizations’ mission since such organizations operate the transformation of 
public money acquired by taxes in another type of “capital”, consisting in the level 
of services, organization, legal framework, that fosters the human and economic 
development of a Country. Hernando De Soto was the first one to examine 
quantitatively such transformation process and to identify in the capital produced 
by public organizations the multiplier of the economic capital of both families and 
enterprises. As a consequence, the quantity and density of the “capital” produced 
by public organizations influence the development perspectives of the economic 
potential of a country (De Soto 2000). This economist was also the first to 
elaborate a theoretical framework to explain the roots of the differences in the 
degree of development among States. He can be considered the inspirer of this 
study, although the present work try to innovate the current knowledge by focusing 
on economic incentives of capital production performed by public organizations. 
Such incentives are addressed to the benefit of both the functioning of public 
organizations and private enterprises.  
The capital production process needs to respect economic and financial 
constraints as well as to work with a sufficient amount of financial resources. Both 
conditions are complied not only through efficiency in the consumption of 
resources but also through effectiveness in acquiring them. If on the one hand the 
current financial crisis obliges to respect a difficult trade-off between development 
and finance shortage through efficiency, on the other hand the globalization pushes 
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for a step further: being effective in acquiring new financial resources at an 
international level.  
Governments, in most of the Countries, seem to ignore that global competition 
concerns not only private organizations, but also the public ones. A higher or lower 
reliance and affordability in legal framework, an abundance or scarcity of 
incentives, taxes and facilities concern private organization more than policy 
makers currently believe, and this explains the reason why in certain areas of the 
world there is a higher concentration of economic players than in other ones. 
Furthermore, while public organizations operate in a fixed location, private ones 
move according to the competitive advantages offered by being localized in a given 
nation. Public institutions collect for their functioning what the private ones pay in 
taxes. Competition of the private ones strictly depends on the level of facilities 
provided by the public ones. Both types of organizations are reciprocally necessary 
for the achievement of their missions and both are strictly necessary for the wealth 
of a nation.  
First of all, this study, based on the Italian experience, aims to enlighten the 
key critical items of the Italian State’s programming cycle and, in general, of those  
focused exclusively on the inputs, i.e. financial resources to collect. Such 
programming cycles have led during the current financial crisis to naive economic 
recovery strategies of the type “tax increase and cut public services and 
investments”. Oppositely to such strategies, this study designs a new State’s 
programming paradigm based on the development of the Country’s strategic assets, 
such new programming cycle may occur along three phases: 1) The State identifies 
the strategic assets for the Country’s economic development and focuses its 
strategies on them; 2) Policy makers implement policies (performance drivers) in 
order to achieve the development of such strategic assets; 3) Improvement and 
enrichment of the society are given by the “cash flows” (end results) arising from 
investments in strategic assets. Indeed, such end results are expended to consolidate 
State’s financial accounts and invested once again (by reiteration of the process) in 
strategic resources, thus producing even more appreciable end results. 
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The study will also analyse a new way for State organization to get over the 
crisis based on a brand new strategic approach of collaborating with private firms 
for “co-creating” their global competitive advantage. This presupposes for public 
organizations, firstly for the State, to promote their relationships with the territory 
in the perspective of performance management and to foster the tool of policy 
evaluation, either ex ante or ex post. This topic will be illustrated in Chapters 3 and 
4 where, via a System dynamics model, it will be demonstrated how the 
improvement of legal and organizational framework lead to a higher 
competitiveness of private firms and consequently to an increase in financial 
resources for State organization. The model quantifies such result for the State by 
linking it to taxation of larger firms’ profits and less expenditures for 
unemployment benefits and equalization grants. 
Furthermore, the present study also addresses the question on how to overcome 
the current gap in information of policy makers, due to the lack of analysis of how 
the complex of organizational and the legal frameworks influences the cost 
structure of firms producing in the country. So far this issue has been analyzed by 
international and national institutions but their surveys are rather focused on 
qualitative and quantitative evaluations of variables concerning the organizational 
and legal frameworks of each country. Such surveys, in fact, do not aim to estimate  
relative costs supported by firms and their effects in terms of firms’ global 
competition and States’ development. 
For these purposes, a System dynamic model has been built and tested since 
this methodology, more than other management tools, requires ex ante a 
specification of objectives, hypothesis, relationships, means and a scrutiny of 
results, and implementation issues of a policy. The System dynamics methodology 
tries to identify and test policies for dynamic problems, i.e. problems arising from 
the mutual interaction and circular causality among variables. Nowadays, System 
dynamics covers large breadth of applications (social, managerial and economic 
systems) and bases itself on a multidisciplinary approach. 
Two reasons make indispensable the use of simulation models, first of all those 
of System dynamics. Firstly, the solution of problem arising by interactions of tens 
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of variables and by circular causality relationships among them. This contrasts with 
the current mental model reasoning in terms of “instantaneous relationships” (A 
causes B). System dynamics models keep into account at the same time interactions 
of all variables and their causal relationships. Secondly, simulation models reduce 
drastically the time and resources employed for public planning and control. 
Oppositely to long and costly processes, these models enable not only the fast 
definition/redefinition of the strategies to pursue, but also quick decisions based on 
an objective and trustful information. 
The present study starts by introducing, through evidences given by reports and 
statistics, the issue of the Italian legal and organizational framework and its 
consequences for the Country’s economy in the last two decades.  
In Chapter 2, the Italian State’s programming cycle and its related key critical 
items are described both theoretically and practically.  
In Chapter 3, a case study reveals the figures in the game, both for State and 
enterprises, within a sustainable State-territory strategizing. The case study shows 
the impact, in terms of costs for a production enterprise, of the following factors: a) 
Interest rates for financing investments and deposit advances; b) Delays in 
obtaining authorizations and cashing accounts receivables from public 
administrations; c) Shipping costs depending on availability of infrastructures 
(motorways, ports, airports); d) Cost of utilities; e) Cost for work unit and social 
security tax; f) Jurisdictional delay in settling commercial disputes; g) Tax and 
administrative compliance; h) Taxes on profits; i) Real estate tax.  
When the State commitment to improve the competitiveness of its territory is 
low, the poor strategizing of State causes more costs for firms and foreign 
investors, which lead to lower earnings and, eventually, lower tax income for the 
State. In an open and free market, as the one of the Europe Union, additional costs 
expose Italian firms to the danger of failure under the aggressive competition of 
foreign companies, and the Italian State to the danger of delocalization of Italian 
enterprises with the related consequences in terms of State’s tax base erosion and 
additional expenditures for equalization benefits.  
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Model thus simulates the behaviour of key performance indicators of 
enterprises as well as the financial loss for the Italian State on a ten-yearly horizon. 
Certainly, policies of type “tax increase and cut public services and 
investments”, insisting blindly on consolidating public finances, result into 
undermining the present and future contributing capacity of enterprises and 
citizens, and reliability of receipts forecasts in future public budgets.  Oppositely, 
investing in strategic assets such as a good organizational and legal framework 
allows citizens and enterprises to develop their undisclosed potential, to produce 
more, to avoid delocalization and to increase attractiveness of foreign investors.  
In Chapter 4, the issue of sustainable financial policies in State organization is 
further developed and extended towards the direction traced by the theories of 
“Holistic development” and “Social Capital”. An application of the first theory has 
proved that State policies, when are designed according to a collaborative approach 
with the other institutions of State’s territory, produce the achievement of 
appreciable financial results not only for the recipients of State organization (i.e. 
enterprises and families) but also for the State itself. 
The model results illustrated in this chapter report, with respect to the previous 
results and at a constant tax leverage, a considerable improvement of key 
performance indicators of enterprises as well as an additional tax income and less 
expenditures for the Italian State, thus demonstrating the positive effects of an 
increase in competitiveness on both enterprises and State performances. 
An holistic development strategy has also a positive reflection over the socio-
economic and environmental context in which public strategies take place. Good 
management, services and transparency foster in individuals their social 
commitment, honesty, and a solid trust towards public institutions and therefore the 
development of the social capital into the society. Such capital benefits the society 
as a whole in terms of lower transaction costs, fewer opportunistic behavior and 
speed of information among institutions. By reducing costs for enterprises social 
capital thus represents a key factor of the global competitiveness of Italy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
FROM THE “GLASS BELL” TO  THE PROBLEM  
AWARENESS 
 
1.1 A problem of managerial culture or of State organization’s vision and 
strategy? 
 
In dealing with the low growth of Italian economy over the last two decades 
some  economists have been identifying the causes of such phenomenon into the 
“soft capitalistic” culture of internal economic players. This hypothesis seems very 
naive and simplistic. Surely the culture plays an important role in mental models or 
specific preferences but the issue needs a differentiation. Indeed, there are factors 
constituting the a deep-rooted and not modifiable identity of the country and 
factors determined by economic and juridical constraints (De Soto, 2001).  
Over the last two decades the Italian average annual growth rates lagged well 
below the EU average (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The Italy’s GDP growth from 2000 to 2012 (including forecast 2013) compared with the      
EU’s GDP growth (source: OECD). 
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Looking back to 1995, anyway, we can see that Italy’s GDP per capita was 
very close to the one of big EU economies (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2: Comparison of GDP per capita in Italy, France, Spain, UK and Germany from 1995 to 2010        
(in thousands of Euro) 
 
Which are the reasons of this recession specifically for Italy, despite the great 
opportunities disclosed by the European integration process through the Schengen 
Agreement (from 1995) and the following adoption (1998-2002) of the common 
currency? Is the weak growth reported by the Italian economy a result of a cultural 
levity in doing business or it has to be linked to other reasons? 
In order to try to identify the most important and problematic areas underlying 
the Italian economy’s  low growth rate, it’s necessary to analyze and measure its 
competitiveness.   
Firstly, the competitiveness of a country could be defined as the effort to reach 
a country’s economic development compatible with the level of social evolution of 
the country itself (Porter,1990; Zanetti, 2006). Competitiveness is measured with 
respect to similar competitors since the comparison of countries with different 
social evolution and development degree is unworthy. 
With another meaning, the competitiveness could be defined as the “set of 
institutions, policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a 
country” (Schwab 2012). Adopting such definition, then, we can obtain an 
Source: OECD 
2011 
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appreciable overview of the competitiveness level of the Italian economy through 
the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) developed by Xavier Sala-i-Martin and 
Elsa V. Artadi (2004). The GCI has been using since 2004 by the World Economic 
Forum to assess the ability of countries to provide high levels of prosperity to their 
citizens. This in turn depends on how productively a country uses available 
resources. Therefore, the Global Competitiveness Index measures the complex of 
institutions, policies, and factors (so called “pillars”) that set the current and 
medium-term levels of economic prosperity of the countries analyzed. 
Each “pillar” of competitiveness include a group of micro and macroeconomic 
variables. The assessment of such variables is provided by means of quantitative 
and qualitative methods by partner institutes settled in each analyzed country. The 
“12 pillars” of competitiveness whose performance qualifies the degree of 
economic development of each of 142 countries analyzed are: 
a) Institutions; 
b) Infrastructure; 
c) Macroeconomic environment; 
d) Health and primary education; 
e) Higher education and training; 
f) Goods’ market efficiency; 
g) Labor market efficiency; 
h) Financial market development; 
i) Technological readiness; 
j) Market size; 
k) Business sophistication; 
l) Innovation. 
Even though several components of GCI are based on subjective estimations 
they offer useful insights to inquire into the roots of loss in competitiveness among 
the Italian economic players, private and public. 
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All pillars and their indicators have been taken into account in the following 
analysis, except “Health and primary education” and “Higher education and 
training” pillars, because, based on the assumptions of the model described in 
Chapter 3, the latter do not affect the operational costs of enterprises.  
Results are reported in Figure 3: the first column reports the absolute values 
reached by Italy for each item, the second one shows the GCI rank among the 
countries analyzed (Schwab 2012). 
 
 
The situation portrayed in Table 1 shows two different aspects of the Italian 
global competitiveness or, in other words, opposite behaviours among public and 
private institutions. On the one side, Table 1 shows evidence of a certain 
sluggishness of public management (tax, administrative, market and legal 
framework) to the instances of economic operators, criticality that results in higher 
costs sustained by market players in carrying on their activity within the national 
boundaries. On the other side, it shows many different items where Italian 
entrepreneurs have reached a solid competitive advantage. Such advantage stems, 
first of all, from the breadth of value chain, from the nature of competitive 
advantage and, as a distinguishing landmark of Italian economic fabric, from the 
state of cluster development. 
Source: World Economic Forum (WEF) 2012. 
Table 1: Breakdown of the Global Competitiveness Index of Italy 
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Based on a yearly survey included in the Global Competitiveness Report 
(Schwab 2012) the most problematic factors of doing business in Italy are listed 
below: 
1) Inefficient Government bureaucracy: 19.0%; 
2) Tax rates: 16.1%; 
3) Access to financing: 13.6%; 
4) Restrictive labour regulation: 10.7%; 
5) Inadequate supply of infrastructure: 10.1%; 
6) Tax regulations: 9.3%; 
7) Corruption: 6.9%; 
8) Policy (not political) instability: 6.8%. 
All these burdens, as weighted up by national market players, represent the 
92.5% of most problematic barriers of doing business in Italy and erode company’s 
profitability. It’s interesting to note that factors like “crime and theft” and 
“inadequately educated workforce” gained a respective percentage of 1.8% and 
1.2%: in other way round, these factors are substantially irrelevant. 
Another important factor 
to take into account in the 
analysis of Italian global 
competitiveness is the 
behaviour of the production 
cost indicator. 
The root of this change are 
doubtless traceable in the 
dynamics of production costs 
over the last two decades. 
Table 2 reports the 
manufacturing costs’ indicators 
for Italy, Germany and France 
Germany France Italy Spain
1990 94,9 100,0 118,5 114,9
1991 94,6 97,3 118,5 114,4
1992 98,4 100,2 116,3 112,5
1993 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
1994 98,6 98,9 97,3 95,6
1995 101,9 100,9 92,3 97,7
1996 96,6 99,6 101,5 98,9
1997 91,1 94,2 101,0 93,9
1998 93,2 95,6 102,9 94,6
1999 90,7 93,8 101,3 94,0
2000 83,5 88,3 97,1 90,3
2001 85,8 88,9 98,3 91,3
2002 87,0 90,6 100,5 93,5
Source: Bank of Italy 2005
Table 2: Manufacturing costs’ indicators for Italy, Germany 
and France from 1990 to 2002 (1993=100) 
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and Spain from 1990 to 2005.  
The period taken into account is of crucial importance in order to understand 
the dynamics of manufacturing costs recorded in Italy. In 1992-1993 a devaluation 
of national currency Lira occurred, the last before 1998, when were set fixed 
conversion rates among the European currencies before the adoption of Euro in 
2002. As result, the manufacturing costs decreased reaching their minimum for an 
interlude of two years. In the subsequent eight years they reached the same level of 
1993 while they have shrunk in the same period in France and Germany, 
respectively of 9.4% and 
13%. After the adoption 
of Euro, without the sole 
lever of issuing money to 
reduce production costs, 
these last have showed a 
higher growth compared 
to the average recorded, 
in the same period, in the 
whole Euro zone. 
Based on the above 
data, it’s easy to explain 
why the Italian production system moved toward a non-price competitiveness 
model where differentiation, quality, innovation, design, customization, pre and 
post sales customer care are the hallmarks; while the price competitiveness 
production system has almost disappeared. 
Manufacturing costs dynamics of countries belonging to the European Union 
are of crucial importance in order to understand in- and outflows of manufacturing 
firms as well as localization of extra-European FDIs among countries within 
Union’s boundaries. 
Manufacturing costs include the cost of labor. It is worth noting that, although 
this cost is 35% lower than Germany’s one, and in general the lowest among the 
Δ % Δ %
2002 96,1 - 92,1 -
2003 96,2 + 0,1 93,6 + 1,6
2004 97,6 + 1,4 96,1 + 2,7
2005 100,0 + 2,5 100,0 + 4,0
2006 101,8 + 1,8 105,2 + 5,2
2007 104,7 + 2,8 108,7 + 3,3
2008 108,3 + 3,4 115,1 + 5,9
2009 106,1 - 2,0 108,9 - 5,4
2010 109,1 + 2,8 112,2 + 3,0
2011 113,5 + 4,0 117,8 + 5,0
2012
I-trim. 114,4 120,1
II-trim. 115,0 120,7
III-trim. 114,7 121,5
Source: Istat 2013.
Euro zone Italy
Index Index
General index of production prices of industrial products (base 2005)
Period
Table 3: Manufacturing costs’ indicators comparison between Italy 
and UE from 2002 to 2012 (2005=100) 
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western European countries (except Spain), Italy has always recorded a higher 
increase of manufacturing costs compared to its competitors.   
Table 4: Average gross annual earning of a full time employees from 2008 to 2010. Source: Eurostat 
 
Whether the work unit’s cost is not responsible for the constant increase of 
manufacturing costs, but rather represents a key competitive factor of Italian 
economy, explications of low global competitiveness phenomenon ought to be 
traced outside.  
Following two figures report statistics concerning the burden of 
“Government’s regulations” and “Total tax rate”, as reported in Table 1, Italy’s 
performances are respectively 140
th
 and 132
nd
 in a rank of 142 countries. Figures 3 
and 4 confirm that the causes of Italy’s low global competitiveness could be traced 
effectively outside the enterprise’s perimeter. 
 13 
 
 
Figure 3: Time to comply with Government’s tax regulations (in hours) in Italy and its main 
European competitors in 2011 
 
 
Figure 4: Total tax rates for enterprises in Italy and in its main European competitors in 2011 
 
This preliminary analysis conducted about the decrease in competitiveness of 
Italy over the last two decades portrays the following evidences: the actions of 
Italian governments in the first decade (1992-2002) have been blindly oriented 
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towards creating a short term competitive advantage in reducing manufacturing 
costs through inflation. After 2002, without leverage of issuing money, the Italian 
State was still incapable to invest in the productivity and global competitiveness of 
Italy. It should have been highly necessary to deal with the causes of an excessive 
inefficiency of public institutions, legal framework and infrastructures in order to 
create a long term competitive advantage for firms. Nowadays, this exigency may 
not be absolutely deferred. In the open market represented by the whole European 
Union the competition occurs also among States in providing the best economic 
environment and less costs for market players. The State is a public organization 
that ought to be managed in a business like perspective, with a sustainable and 
effective financial policy and a strategy that enables it to create a long lasting 
value. 
Today Italy is in transition towards this kind of organizational model. As 
illustrated in Figure 5 the spread in public general administrative expenses, 
between Italy and its European competitors decreased from 1995 to 2008. 
Comparing Italy with the best European competitor, United Kingdom, the spread 
has decreased from 830 b.p. (+243% of UK value) to 430 b.p. (+191% of UK 
value). But still today Italy’s public general administrative expenses remain the 
highest among the west European countries. 
As mentioned in the introduction and further deepened in the present overview, 
Figure 5: Public general administrative expenses (in % of GDP) in Italy and its main European competitors 
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performance dynamics of public and private organizations are strictly connected. A 
negative spread of 430 b.p. in the amount of public general administrative expenses 
allows United Kingdom to lower tax pressure and to invest more in research (both 
calculated in percentage to GDP), essential factors increasing the global 
competitiveness, and thus attractiveness of the country. 
In deficiency of a reliable long term strategy reside dominantly the threats of 
delocalization, high mortality of national firms and absence of foreign direct 
investments in the country. For the State organization this represents a large loss in 
fiscal receipts and more expenditure for equalization grants. At this point the only 
leverage available will be to increase taxation further and further, but this would 
lead to lesser and lesser presence of market players. At the end of several iteration 
of this process, who will pay the taxes? 
 
1.2.   A shift of game’s rules in State organization’s strategizing 
 
Sixty year ago the economic and political integration process to create the 
European Union was just beginning. Below we list the main steps relevant to the 
present work: 
 1951 Treaty of Paris establishes the European Coal and Steel Community 
 1957 Treaties of Rome establish the European Economic Community  
 1962 Launch of the Common Agricultural Policy 
 1968 Completion of the customs union allowing the free movement of 
goods 
 1979 Launch of the European Monetary System 
 1985 Schengen agreement settling free circulation of people in the EU 
 1986 The Single European Act launches the single-market program and 
extends Community competence in the fields of environmental policy, 
economic and social cohesion, research and technology policy, and social 
policy 
 1989 Extension of Commission responsibility for competition policy 
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 1992 The Treaty on European Union sets the EU on the road to economic 
and monetary union 
 1999 Launch of a common monetary policy and a single currency (the 
Euro) 
 2002 The Adoption of euro 
 2004 EU leaders agree on and later sign the Constitutional Treaty 
 2005 The directive 2005/36/EC directive establishes a system for the 
recognition of professional qualifications, in order to liberalize the 
provision of services within EU 
The aforementioned scheme shows three phases. 
The EU integration process first aimed to create a free movement of goods 
(1968) and people (1985) within the EU boundaries; then to settle common rules in 
the field of environment, social cohesion, technology, recognition of professional 
qualifications, competition, necessary to build the legal and administrative common 
framework within the European Union; finally to adopting a common currency and 
the Constitutional Treaty.  
The end of economic and legal barriers in Europe resulted in a competition 
shift from a national scale to an international one. In Italy, great expansion 
opportunities were faced in a completely different ways by the private companies 
and State organization.  
In Italy, SMEs, which constitute the 99,9% of the total enterprises of the 
country (European Commission 2010), have put great efforts in adapting their 
activity to the new global competition and reached the second highest level of 
cluster development in the world (Schwab 2012). The cluster is as a sectoral and 
geographical concentration of connected businesses, suppliers, and associates in a 
specific field that increase the efficiency and productivity  through a “competitive 
collaboration” (Pezzani, 2011) of all the actors in different phases: (a) along the 
value chain of a product (vertical); (b) the production of similar products 
(horizontal). The cluster is the most important key success factor for Italian 
economy. Its roots are traceable in the adaptation capacity of Italian SMEs to the 
global contest of competitiveness. The cluster enables Italian enterprises to gain, 
although their small proportions, not only typical benefits of large-scale 
 17 
 
enterprises, such as the costs reduction for R&D, delivery and production, but also 
the advantages of product differentiation and faster adaptation to the market needs, 
that large-scale enterprises cannot attend. 
In the same period of time, unfortunately the Italian public management did not 
adapt itself to the new world economic scenario. A prevalent juridical and 
bureaucratic perspective in managing public organizations has prevented them to 
be not only efficient in respecting their economic and financial constraints but also 
effective in “co-creating” with private enterprises a global competitive advantage 
of Italian economic system as a whole. The Italian political sluggishness in 
investing resources in facilities and in creating a more efficient organizational and 
legal framework, increased, on the one side, the mortality rate of the companies, 
and, on the other, their relocation abroad in “more lenient” States in order to seek 
an additional competitive advantage. By doing this, Italy has faced poorer and 
poorer budget balances.  
In other words, the strategizing scenario of Italian policy makers, is still focused 
within the national boundaries and not at least on a European level. The main 
features of such strategic formulation of Italian policy makers could be synthesized 
by the following statements: 
a) Taxation does not affect enterprises’ product price and investments 
and consequently their global competitiveness; 
b) The level of infrastructures and the public legal and administrative 
context do not influence the production costs and the financial solidity of 
enterprises. 
c) Enterprises will not relocate to seek abroad a competitive advantage; 
d) The tax pressure is justified by the State’s financial needs; 
e) Focus on public organizations’ budget balances, not on the 
percentage of public revenues spent for public services. 
f) Lack of strategic and operative benchmarking with other countries; 
g) Lack of policies’ sensitive analysis in order to set the optimal point 
of tax yield according to firms’ fiscal capacity and competitiveness. 
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This view of thinking should move to a vision where, starting from the source 
of public organizations finances, the policymaker co-strategizes with enterprises 
and citizens in order to provide them the best localization’s advantages.  The 
present research addresses to test the effectiveness of such strategic approach, and 
to show how the majority of adopted anti-crisis’ policies have been unsustainable 
both for State and enterprises, since they have been focused on financial stability of 
State institutions and not on increasing wealth of private ones, which would in turn 
assure them the financial stability in the long term.  
The validity of such approach in public strategizing will be tested in Chapter 3 
through the provision of the case study based on the System dynamics 
methodology, a new management tool which tries to identify and test policies for 
dynamic problems. Such problems are known to arise from the mutual interaction 
and circular causality among variables, concerning a particular issue. This 
methodology has been considered useful according to the relevant number of 
variables and their causal relationships that should be included in public 
strategizing.  
 
1.3 The phenomenon of “strategic asset-seeking” relocation 
 
The relocation represents the highest stage of internationalization of production 
and commercial activities. From the point of view of the individual country, this 
can be both active and passive if it involves respectively an exit or an entry in the 
Figure 6: Actual vs desired spatial horizon of Italian public strategizing 
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number of firms operating in a country. The internationalization is realized through 
different modalities, which can be divided into three broad categories: a) 
international trade, b) cooperation agreements, c) foreign direct investment (Beber 
1996). 
International trade is the exchange of goods and services through the national 
borders, and is usually the first method adopted by the businesses that start to face 
the global market, as it implies a low degree of involvement and risk on the part of 
companies. In the international trade are included exports and imports and trade of 
goods and services. It is estimated that over three-quarters of the international trade 
is undertaken by multinational enterprises and over a third is based on intra-
companies trade (Ietto-Gillies, 2005) . 
The second category consists of non-equity or cooperative agreements that do 
not involve investment in shares of companies. Such forms of internationalization 
may act in different ways (Ietto-Gillies, 2005): a) licensing b) franchise; c) 
alliances, d) subcontracting. 
The foreign direct investments (FDI) are the most direct form of 
internationalization, as they lead an enterprise’s direct investment to participate in 
the capital of foreign companies, possibly with one or more partners (mergers or 
acquisitions of equity stakes and joint ventures). They thus represent the most 
challenging and articulated modes of entry into foreign markets, as they require a 
significant investment of resources and a long-term commitment. The IDE are 
distinguished in the literature in two categories: greenfield investments, when 
consisting in the opening of a new economic unit, and brownfield investments, 
when the growth in capacity involves a certain amount of fixed capital that already 
exists. 
FDI, depending on the reasons for which it is undertaken, may have a very 
different impact on the economy of the country of origin and destination of the 
investment. Such reasons can be grouped into the following four categories 
(Horstmann and Markusen 1996, Markusen et al. 1996): 1) Resources seeking 
investments, that provide a privileged access to essential production inputs; 2) 
Capital costs savings, that aim to rationalize the structure of production locating the 
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activities of the value chain in the countries in which is possible to achieve a cost 
advantage; 3) Market seeking investments, aimed to ensure direct supervision of 
markets to high potential of development in which the firm can take advantage over 
local businesses; 4) Investments strategic asset-seeking, motivated by the need to 
gain access to assets of complementary strategic importance. 
The firms carrying out “resources seeking” and “costs saving” investments 
deconstruct their value chain through the relocation of activities. Such activities are 
generally work-intensive and necessitate mainly low-skilled jobs, otherwise they 
require a significant procurement of resources in markets where they are available 
at convenient conditions. 
Companies undertaking “market seeking” investments usually create 
decentralized commercial structures in target countries and, if those countries are 
far apart, also establish their production activity. Moreover, these investments are 
typical of the service companies because of territoriality and proximity features of 
the specific services provided. 
Instead, companies that invest to access “asset of strategic importance” are 
those that according to Bortolussi, Secretary of CGIA Mestre, relocate for the 
following reasons: taxes, bureaucracy, high social security, logistical and 
infrastructural deficits, inefficiency of public administration, lack and high cost of 
credit to businesses, and cost of energy. Often these insurmountable obstacles have 
led many entrepreneurs to move to neighbouring countries where enterprises can 
access to such assets of complementary strategic importance (CGIA Mestre 2013). 
The effects of these relocations not belonging to the categories of “resource 
seeking” and “market seeking”, and “cost savings” are those analyzed in this study. 
Such relocation is carried out mainly within the western countries of the European 
Union, facilitated by the free exchange of goods, from a wide and fast circulation 
of information, from the proximity, and economic and political stability of the 
addressed countries. 
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It is no coincidence that in 2011, out of a total of 27,191 companies relocated, 
41.4% of them have relocated in Western Europe (ICE 2013)
1
. 
The country that is most attractive for Italian entrepreneurs is France: are 2,562 
the Italian companies which have transferred a portion of its production chain in 
this country. "An element of strong appeal – as referred by Bortolussi - is the 
certainty of law. In France, for example, the payment terms are more precise and 
more rapid than what happens to us. French justice system works and who does not 
pay will be pursued and sanctioned. Not to mention that the response times of local 
authorities are squeezed, contrary to what happens in Italy, where the only certainty 
is the delays that accompany almost every public practice". 
After France, among the top six world’s countries that have attracted the 
interests of Italian companies are the United States (2,408 companies), Germany 
(2,099 firms), Romania (1,992 production units), Spain (1,925 companies) and 
United Kingdom (1,856 companies). China is in seventh place, with 1,103 Italian 
enterprises that have chosen to continue their productive activities in the Far East. 
Foreign companies participated by Italian firms, employ abroad 1,557,038 peoples 
and develop a total turnover of 583,762 million of euro (ICE 2013). 
The Regions most hit by the "escape" of their companies abroad are localized 
in the North. In Lombardy the number of companies relocated abroad is 9,647; in 
Veneto and Emilia Romagna respectively 3,679 and 3,554; 2,806 in Piedmont. 
These Regions comprise over the 72% of the total number of enterprises that have 
left Italy, thus confirming the proximity of country’s borders as a landmark of the 
“asset seeking” delocalization. 
Nearly one out of two (48.3% of total) operates in the wholesale business, their 
assets mainly comprise commercial branches of Italian manufacturing enterprises. 
Such enterprises are followed by those of manufacturing industry (28.6% of the 
total) and logistics (6.2% of the total). 
An interesting study conducted by the Italian Centre for Social Responsibility 
(ICSR 2008), and portrayed in Figure 10, shows for big and medium enterprises
2
 
                                                 
1
 Source: Istituto per il Commercio Estero (ICE). Analysis has been conducted over productive 
activities abroad with a minimum turnover of  € 2.5 million and work force of 10 units. 
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with more than 50 employees their degree of internationalization according to the 
scheme provided at the beginning of the present paragraph. 
Although the most recent data are not available, this analysis gives an 
appreciable and clear image of the internationalization behaviour of Italian 
enterprises. Almost 30% of the total big enterprises and 11% of the total of medium 
ones above 50 employees operate globally along the three levels of 
internationalization mentioned above: international trade, non-equity or corporate 
agreement, FDI’s (golden yellow marked). Since most of the services companies 
are characterized by the need for proximity to their clients, their 
internationalization degree is lower than that recorded for manufacturing 
companies.  
 
Figure 7: Internationalization degree of Italian big and medium enterprises (>50 employees) in 2007 
 
Concerning the specific case of manufacturing companies, the figure above 
shows a critical issue that should be kept into consideration by public policy 
                                                                                                                                       
2
 According to Article 2 of the Annex of Recommendation 2003/361/EC the category of micro, 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is made up of enterprises which employ fewer than 250 
persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million euro, and/or an annual balance 
sheet total not exceeding 43 million euro. Big enterprises are those exceeding these thresholds. 
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makers in a State Global Competitive Strategy (SGCS): 32.1% of big 
manufacturing companies and 11.3% of the medium ones have relocated their 
production activity abroad (orange marked). With almost the same percentage they 
have developed their new activities abroad (yellow marked). Moreover, 16,4% of 
big manufacturing companies and 4,2% of the medium ones have pursued both 
strategies of delocalization of their production activities and development of new 
ones abroad.  
The opportunity of internationalization and the connected issue of relocation of 
production activities have concerned the Italian legislation since 1990. Its 
interventions have been designed to address two specific needs, apparently 
contradictory: on the one hand, to promote the internationalization of Italian firms 
while, on the other hand, to avoid the employment crisis caused by a massive 
relocation (Giusti, 2008). Such policies have been implemented in different times. 
In the first decade, the legislator’s intentions were to simply incentivize the 
internationalization of Italian enterprises.  
Law n. 100/1990 established the Italian Society for Joint Ventures Abroad 
(SIMEST in the Italian acronym) to promote and ensure sustainable investments 
abroad, and to participate, whether necessary, capital (up to 25 per cent for up to 8 
years) in manufacturing companies established abroad by Italian resident 
companies. SIMEST also facilitates market penetration that often precedes a FDI, 
through export credits, and promotes participation in international tenders for the 
award of contracts, besides to act for the support of “Made in Italy”. 
Under Law 57/2001, the participation in enterprises established abroad has been 
further promoted by increasing incentives for internationalization of enterprises, 
especially small and medium ones. Law 56/2005 has set up several "one-stop 
shops" in the countries partners of Italy for relevant commercial and industrial 
interests. These represent multi-purpose public offices to ensure and extend support 
to Italian companies operating in those places through advice and guidance of the 
public, even in the form of legal protection of businesses and their rights of 
industrial and intellectual property. 
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Afterwards, over the last decade, in order to avoid the delocalization’s effects 
in terms of unemployment, the Italian legislator seems oriented to establish certain 
conditions to contain the phenomenon and incentivize the so called “back shoring”. 
Under this new logic Law 80/2005 was issued. It establishes that all the benefits 
described so far are valid under the condition of permanence within the national 
territory of the marketing and research and development departments as well as of 
a substantial part of production activities. Such law, according to the new logic of 
“back shoring”, provides incentives to Italian firms that have invested abroad and 
have the intention to reinvest in Italy: such companies will enjoy the same benefits 
and incentives that the law reserves to foreign companies that invest or delocalize 
in Italy.  
Recently, the planning of incentives to limit delocalization, and to foster the 
development of new activities, is undertaken, in Italy, by Regions according to the 
framework established by EU and the Italian Government. The most relevant 
action has been the establishment of Urban Free Zones (ZFU). These have been 
enabled by the Finance Act 2008 (Law 244/2007, Art. 2) and the financial coverage 
is provided both from State and Regions. These areas, located in the south of Italy, 
will give to new investors a tax exemption in a period variable from 5 to 14 years 
(PMI 2013). 
Although over the past two decades the legislator intervention increased 
incentives to contain the phenomenon of delocalization and to foster the so called 
“back shoring”, delocalization seems likely to be contained more by the current 
crisis than by the legislator’s interventions, as showed to the next figure. 
From 2000 to 2011 Italian FDI in the world have increased of +10,714 units 
(+65% with an average yearly growth of 5.9%), their work force units employed 
abroad of +404,673 (+35%), and their sales of +362,902 (+164%) million euro 
(ICE 2013). Figure 11 shows their pattern from 2001 to 2010. In 2011, Italian FDIs 
in the world have increased of just 0,1% units (ICE 2013).  
If 41.4% of the Italian FDI are carried out in West Europe, in Countries having 
a similar economy sophistication and cost structure as Italy, this means that 
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enterprises are more concerned about the complementary strategic assets offered by 
a country and not simply by financial aid, as provided by the Italian legislator. 
 
Figure 8: Dynamics of Italian FDIs in the World from 2000 to 2010 
 
An adequate response to enterprises’ delocalization requires a change of State 
strategizing, more oriented to the long term, trying to create a solid competitive 
advantage through structural interventions and not palliative measures, and by 
means of a strong and fruitful relationship with the territory in which public 
organizations operate. The “holistic development” approach, introduced in Chapter 
4, explains how State strategies should target the development of the territory as a 
whole. As in the territory operate other economic entities (enterprises and families), 
each one pursuing its strategy, the strategy of the State must be compared and 
harmonized with such entities in order to create the conditions for a common 
success.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ITALIAN STATE’S PLANNING AND CONTROL AND 
THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC POLICIES’ EVALUATION 
 
2.1. The Italian State’s programming cycle and the coordination among 
different levels of public governance 
 
The Italian State’s programming cycle has been recently innovated in order to 
facilitate the harmonization of public planning among the different level of public 
governance. Such novelties have been introduced by Law 196/2009, introducing a 
new programming cycle and budget schemes for State organization, and by the 
Law 39/2011, adapting the programming cycle to the new European Community’s  
rules for the coordination of the economic and budgetary policies, i.e. the European 
economic governance. 
The programming cycle starts with the Document of Economy and Finance 
(DEF)
3
. Expanding the previous information framework provided by Law 468/78, 
its content includes, now for a three-yearly planning horizon: 
a)   the targets of economic policy; 
b)   the estimates of economy and public finance; 
c)  the estimates under the current legislation of the income statement, the cash 
balance and debt of public administrations; 
d) the objectives regarding the State’s balance and debt expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. 
The DEF illustrates the maneuvers necessary to achieve for each of the three 
years of planning its objectives and indicates any bills related to public finance 
measures to present to Parliament before the month of February. It also includes 
the estimate of the financial resources needed to confirm, for the programming 
                                                 
3
 As named by the law 39/2011. Previously called Decision of Public Finance by law 196/2009.  
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period, the commitments and actions of economic policy included in the budget for 
the major areas of expenditure. 
The programming cycle introduced by Law 196/2009 was amended later by 
Law 39/2012 in order to coordinate it with the programming cycle carried out by 
the European Union - the so-called European semester
4
 - and ensure coordination 
with all levels of government (EU, State, Regions, Provinces). 
While the previous Italian programming cycle started on 15
th
 of July of each 
year the new one, integrating the planning cycle of UE, begins in the month of 
January according to the following scheme: 
- In January, the Commission prepares the analysis of Annual growth in which 
provides surveys on macroeconomic outlook, and elaborates strategic proposals for 
the European economy; 
- In March, the Commission prepares a report on the basis of which the 
European Council sets the main objectives of economic policy for the European 
Union and the Euro area, and the possible reform strategies for each State in order 
to achieve these objectives; 
- In April, the UE member States, taking into account the information 
provided, notify the Commission of their Medium-term Objectives (MTO) and 
main actions of reform they intend to undertake with the upgrade of the Stability 
Pact (SP) and the National Reform Program (NRP). This update occurs, in the case 
of Italy, on the basis of the Document of Economy and Finance (DEF) that has 
replaced the Decision of Public Finance and is programmed each year not anymore 
in September but in the month of April; 
- In the months of June and July, the European Council and the Council of 
Finance Ministers, on the basis of evaluation of the stability programs, provide 
specific information for each country. The Council, if considers necessary to 
                                                 
4
 The European Semester was introduced by the ECOFIN Council of 7 September 2010 with the 
objective of defining a new procedure aimed to a preventive coordination of the economic policies 
and the budgets of the Member States. In order to ensure consistency between the financial 
structural policies and objectives of public finance of each country, the new procedure provides that 
the policy objectives of public finance, economy, and budget of each country are transmitted for its 
evaluation, to the Commission prior to their implementation at the State member level. 
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amend the medium-term objectives and measures set for their accomplishment, 
invites the Member State to revise the program presented; 
- In September, every Member State, taking into account the recommendations 
and the Council’s and Commission’s decisions, that update in the case of Italy the 
DEF presented in April, prepares the budget and the economic policy measures; 
-  By the 15
th
 of October are presented to the Italian Parliament the Measures of 
Public Finance (Manovra di Finanza Pubblica). 
Are no longer programming tools according to the Article 7 of Law 39/2011, 
but are still part of the iterative budget cycle of State, the State’s General Statement 
(Rendiconto Generale dello Stato) and the Bill of Adjustment (Disegno di legge di 
Assestamento), both presented yearly by 30
th
 of June. 
 
2.2. Contents of the Measures of Public Finance 
 
The Measures of Public Finance includes the Bill of Stability and the Bill of 
State’s Budget5. 
Once approved and converted into law, the Stability law contains measures 
necessary to realize, for the three-yearly of planning horizon, the policy’s 
objectives set in the DEF. The law reports (Ministero dell’Economia e delle 
Finanze 2010): 
a) the maximum level of the net financial balance and the recourse to 
the market; 
b) the change in tax rates (except the provisions of Law 42/2009 on 
tributes of local government); 
c) the total amount allocated to the renewal of public contracts; 
d) the financial coverage of laws involving charges higher than 
expected; 
                                                 
5
 The latter is converted into law on 31 December.  
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e) other adjustments purely quantitative; 
f) any rules necessary to ensure the implementation of the Internal 
Stability Pact as well as those aimed to implement the Convergence Pact 
(Article 18 of Law 42 /2009) in order to coordinate in corrective actions 
among the different levels of government (State, Regions, Provinces, etc.) 
The Stability law is accompanied by a Technical-illustrative Annex that shows 
the reconciliation between the Bill of the State’s Budget and the income statement 
of public administrations, the contents of the maneuver and its effects on the public 
finances and the main areas of intervention. This annex also gives estimates of the 
public administrations’ income statement, and their cash account integrated with 
the effects of Measures of Public Finance for the three-yearly planning horizon.  
The update of the Stability program through the Stability law includes a 
framework on the mid-term perspectives of Italian economic policy with an 
indication of the guidelines for its implementation. During the year, any upgrades 
of the budget’s objectives or corrective actions, taken as a result of major 
deviations of public finance from objectives, must be highlighted through a special 
up-to-date note of DEF. The objective is to strengthen the role of planning and 
provide more certainty to the amount of resources made available to public 
administrations with the budget. 
The State’s budget structure and contents were completely redefined by Law 
196/2009. The new budget scheme makes operative the functional classification of 
expenses for missions and programs introduced from 2008. Such classification is 
harmonized with the COFOG
6
 one, initially developed by United Nation and then 
adopted by OECD as a standard for classifying the purposes of government 
activities. For each program is indicated the related COFOG classification to 
enable comparison of functional expenses among States through benchmarking 
analysis. 
The mission and programs classification makes more transparent and effective 
the link between the address role of Parliament, which now decides only the 
                                                 
6
 The Classification of the functions of government, abbreviated as COFOG, has three levels of 
detail: divisions, groups, and classes. Divisions describe the broad objectives of government, while 
groups and classes both define the means by which these broad objectives are achieved (Fiori 2008). 
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amount of budget at the level of program, and the role of public administrations 
responsible for the budget’s allocations and program fulfillment. The realization of 
each program is entrusted to a single responsible administrative unit which 
coordinates its activities with other units when necessary for the program’s 
achievement (Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2010). 
 
 
Figure 9: The new budget structure (expenses) provided by Law 196/2009 
 
By the side of receipts, the new classification includes four different levels of 
data aggregation. The first level contains a breakdown for receipt item: a) tax 
revenues, b) additional tax income, c) revenue arising from disposals and 
amortization of assets and collection of debt, and d) receipts from new debt 
acquisition. At the second level was introduced the distinction between recurring 
revenue and non-recurring revenues. This is particularly relevant not only for the 
evaluation of compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact operated by the 
European bodies, but also for the public accounts forecasts (in particular structural 
debt) effected by the Italian Government. The third level shows receipts according 
to the type of entry. At the fourth level, the tax revenues are distinguished in 
"revenue from ordinary management" and "revenue deriving from assessment and 
control activities", i.e. from those activities aimed to combat tax evasion. 
The informative content of State’s budget is enriched by the provision of data 
sheet for each program and of explanatory notes. The first one illustrates the laws 
that fund the program with indication of the corresponding triennial budget 
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appropriations. The program data sheet is updated every six months so as to 
highlight the changes made during the year to program’s initial estimates. The 
Explanatory notes report for expenditures: 
a) the plan of objectives related to each program and the related 
performance indicators;  
b) the contents of each program and the criteria used for the 
formulation of forecasts.  
The variance analysis of budget is done with the presentation of the State’s 
General Statement to the Houses (30
th
 of June). Such document is accompanied by 
statements on the performance of each Ministry, which display the results and the 
degree of achievement of targets relating to each program assigned and the 
resources used, justifying any deviations from the budget’s initial forecasts.  
The new budget scheme is set according to an accounting structure that tends 
to highlight the main functions of the State and the strategic objectives pursued by 
public spending. It also ensures more flexibility by possibility to reshape, through 
the Bill of State’s Budget, the costs within a program or between programs within 
the same mission, in respect of the amount of public finances fixed for the mission 
(Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2010). 
The new scheme of documents included in the programming cycles is 
characterized by a wider involvement of the government’s decentralized levels in 
the definition of the budgetary targets and in the planning documents. Furthermore, 
it is more evident the link between European targets, budgetary policies, and the 
contribution required for their achievement and implementation at different levels 
of government.  
Finally, the extension of planning horizon enabled by the mid-term orientation 
of State’s programming cycle gives the right importance to structural reforms 
whose the Country needs. Budgetary forecast are revised every year during the 
planning cycle in order to take into account any events influencing the budgetary 
forecasts and objectives’ accomplishment.    
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2.3. Main criticalities of Italian State’s programming cycle 
 
The new programming cycle enabled by Law 196/2009 has undoubtedly 
improved the Italian State’s planning and control. Such enhancement has 
concerned the specification of mid-term objectives, the involvement of different 
levels of governance in public planning, wider informative contents, and the 
settlement of responsibility’s center for each approved program.  
The improvement process is still in progress. Decree 91/2011 fixed guidelines 
for the harmonization among accounting schemes of different level of public 
administration. Law 31/2011 fixed new terms for the reformation of expense 
procedures concerning the capital funding for public works, and of expenses’ 
analysis and control. Furthermore, new terms concern the revision of budget and 
balance sheet structure, i.e. missions and programs, and the introduction of a cash 
basis balance sheet whose adoption should be extended to all public 
administrations. 
Notwithstanding the strengths of new budget and balance sheet schemes, and 
the efforts in order to complete the programming cycle’s reformation, the planning 
of Italian State is still affected by five orders of criticalities whose a brief overview 
will be provided hereafter. 
 
2.3.1. The lack of evaluation of the policy adopted for the program 
realization 
 
As regards the first criticality, an analysis has been performed directly on the 
informative contents included in the State’s budget. The budget, thus, shows a list 
of financial indicators such as the incidence of missions’ cost out of the total 
budget costs, of programs’ cost out of the total costs of the concerned Ministry. For 
each program, and consequently for each cost responsibility unit (since each 
program is assigned to a single unit) is also indicated the cost of personnel, other 
operating costs, the extraordinary expenses and the assets’ depreciation. Each 
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program also indicates in percentage the costs to be sustained by the Ministry and 
the ones allotted to peripheral Ministry’s structures. 
The realization of the program is calculated on the basis of cost sustained out 
of total allocated by the budget. In many cases specific performance indicators are 
set by policies adopted for each program. The evaluation of performances is 
effected by a department within each Ministry called Organismo Interno di 
Valutazione (O.I.V.)
7
.  
The first criticality of Italian State’s programming cycle, thus, not arise from a 
lack of analysis performed on each program. The current evaluation activity on 
both expenses percentage and performance indicators can be assessed discrete. The 
problem arises upstream. Indicators are set by policies, but who assess whether the 
policy has created a benefit or a harm for the entities concerned? A real example 
will help to clarify the concept. The policy underlying the program “Prevention and 
prosecution of fraud and violations of fiscal obligations” is to stalk enterprises with 
continuous inspections, requests of taxes based on inductive assessment
8
,  
proliferation of administrative and fiscal obligations
9
 since the performance 
indicator aims to collect as much possible tax income for the Tax agency. Such 
indicator is consistent with the policies adopted. On the other hand, such policy 
produces a significant harm for the society and for State’s finances on the long 
term since foster in the society fear, disincentives to invest, frustration (in Italy 
paying taxes one day after the due date results in penalties while a public 
organization pays suppliers with  average delays of 193 and 269 days in healthcare 
against an EU’s average of 45 days, Confartigianato 2012). Such feelings foster 
lesser and lesser presence of enterprises in the State’s territory and consequently 
may lead to a tax base erosion for the Italian State. As observed over the current 
crisis, the austerity measures adopted by the Italian State, as the settlement of some 
taxes, have often recorded for the State a far lower tax income with respect to 
forecasts, and in many cases a financial loss (see example in Chapter 2.4). This 
                                                 
7
 This was introduced by the article 14 of Legislative Decree 150/2009. 
8
 This was introduced by the Decree 600/1973. 
9
 Italy detains the largest time to comply with tax and administrative obligations among the West 
European countries (PWC analysis). For further information, see Figure 3. 
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highlights that good performance indicators are not necessarily coincident with a 
good policy adopted. 
 
2.3.2. The lack of evaluation of the complex of policies in force on the 
specific sectors 
 
The second criticality of the State’s programming cycle is strictly related to the 
issue of public policies’ evaluation but acts differently from with respect to the 
previous one. While this last concerns the single policy designed for the program 
and shows that performance indicators are something different from policy 
performance, the second criticality is related to the complex of policies and laws in 
force on an economy’s sector.  
A high proliferation of laws issued without coordination at all level of public 
governance, continuous public agencies’ clarifications for solving antinomies 
(since often new laws are issued without preordaining the complex of previous 
ones) highlight the lack of evaluation of the complex of rules in force on a specific 
sector. Natural consequences of such deficiency are the law uncertainness and the 
huge burden of Government regulations representing a great threat for the global 
competitiveness of firms localized in Italy. In 2012 the World Economic Forum has 
ranked Italy 140
th
 and 125
th
 out of 142 respectively for ”Burden of Government 
regulations” and “Efficiency of legal framework” indicators (Schwab 2012).  
An intervention to develop an economy’s sector should presuppose a 
systematic appreciation of the results induced by a complex of policies in force on 
such sector at local, regional, national or European level. Such appreciation should 
be carried out not only before (ex-ante), but also during (in itinere), and after the 
completion of the planned activities for the intervention (ex-post). Dallara (2005) 
notes that an important step of the evaluation process is represented by the analysis 
of consistency among the constituents of a plan. To this end the author has 
recommended that the consistent operation of actions and strategic objectives with 
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the external environment must be made prior to the assessment of policies to be 
adopted. 
Evaluating policies has two main basic functions (or expected effects): the 
“policy learning” and the accountability (Dente 2006). The first consists in a help 
provided to policy makers through an "enlightenment" (Weiss 1998). In the context 
of a public policy, the enlightenment leads to: a) modify or correct the prior 
intervention defined in the agenda, or decided, or implemented; b) adopt a new 
intervention, or correction, or completion as evolution of the previous one; c) 
abandon the type of intervention adopted to define one alternative. 
The second type of expected effect is the accountability of the system of policy 
making. A policy maker "accountable" is intended to be more aware of its actions 
and, by dissipating uncertainty about policy’s performance, more accountable on 
the results of its action. This implies that policy makers are held to account for 
facts and to take better into account the criteria of adequacy, feasibility, 
opportunity, consistency, adaptability, utility, equity as well as the criteria typically 
economic such as efficiency and effectiveness (Lippi 2008).  
The evaluation of policies is particularly important when considered in light of 
complexity and uncertainness that makes incalculable government actions. The 
governance of public policies denotes a state where the responsibility of those who 
decide and those who implement is widespread, and therefore problematic, since in 
the uncertainty and fluidity of the relationships among stakeholders becomes even 
more confusing the chain of responsibility (Belligni 2005). Thus, the evaluation 
could represent a necessary way when the decision-making and implementation 
systems are characterized by deconstruction of authority and coordination 
mechanisms scarcely calculable. 
 
2.3.3. Policy’s spatial horizon still focused within national boundaries 
 
The third criticality concerns the spatial horizon of State’s programming cycle. 
Policy’s assumptions as well as results forecasted in policy design are often biased 
by a wrong horizon of analysis. This often occurs mainly for the reasons below: 
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a) Public policies are issued regardless a benchmark analysis of policies (and 
incentives created by them) adopted in other Countries;  
b) Absence of policy learning from successful/failed policies adopted abroad;  
c) Focus on policy’s targets and not to incentives that policy creates to the 
concerned institutions in order to accomplish policy’s targets;  
d) Policies designed without a context analysis aimed to identify key critical 
factors responsible for policy effectiveness such as a free market, 
international agreements, legal constraints, etc. 
In Chapter 1, through evidences given by international reports and statistical 
analysis, has been enlightened an example of how Italian State should analyze the 
impact of policies underlying the legal and organizational framework at an 
international level and in terms of incentives/disincentives created to the concerned 
institutions. Such example has illustrated that enterprises’ performances, their 
mobility, State’s tax income, welfare and competitiveness of Italy are strictly 
connected. 
Therefore, the horizon of the Italian State’s programming cycle should not be 
focused within the State’s boundaries and the impact of policies should be 
evaluated ex ante and ex post adopting at least an European analysis horizon.  
 
2.3.4. Vision oriented to inputs and not to the development of State’s 
strategic assets 
 
The fourth criticality of Italian State’s programming cycle arises directly from 
the cycle’s configuration itself. The budget forecasts State’s financial accounts for 
the three-yearly planning horizon and, being updated to take into account midyear 
adjustments with respect to expectations, quantifies any deficit to be covered over 
the programming period. As mentioned above in the contents of Stability Law sub 
b) and d) Government decides the settlement of new taxes to cover financial 
deficits arising by budget adjustments. This law provision arises not few problems 
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of fairness, methodological consistency of the programming process, and policy 
makers’ accountability for the following reasons: 
a) State’s structural deficit need to be covered by as much structural 
measures: either by cutting public general administrative expenditures or by 
investing on stocks strategic resources (explained below) that will endow 
State with larger income on the long term.   
b) Enterprise and families become “cash cows” when State’s financial 
accounts requires it. In addition, the implementation of the Stability law 
provision is rarely counteracted by benefits that the above institutions 
receive when State records a surplus in its financial accounts, since State 
prefers to consolidate its debt; 
c) The law provision does not make policy makers accountable for 
planning and implementing structural measures, for the consolidation of 
State’s financial accounts, as well as for the consequences of their policies. 
In Italy, a temporary fiscal provision issued to cover a transitory deficit in 
State’s financial accounts becomes often definitive10.  
d) The law provision arises the problem of certainty of law: ever 
changing laws and tax rates depending by short-term financial needs of 
State modify continuously the operational conditions of market players’ and 
their costs for compliance. These factors discourage new economic 
activities and foster enterprises’ mobility abroad, thus reducing State’s tax 
income forecasts. 
e) The programming cycle is centered on State and on inputs for its 
institutional activities, i.e. financial resources. Outputs are not included and 
other society’s institutions (enterprises and families) are independent 
variables from public policies adopted, not strategic assets to develop. 
The main effects of Stability law’s provision to increase taxes when needed are 
represented in the figure below showing the interaction between State’s 
programming cycle and strategies of enterprises and families. Red arrows indicate 
                                                 
10
 A nice example of such “temporary” fiscal measures is the following: still today the fuel price per 
litre includes an excise duty of 1 euro cent for the war in Abyssinia of 1935 (Finanzautile 2011). 
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the “contributes” requested by State from other society’s institutions to its financial 
accounts. Such “contributes” reduce the amount of resources available for the 
growth strategies of these institutions. Green arrows symbolize the State’s 
commitment to benefit other society institutions from its financial programming 
cycle.  
Despite undoubted improvement of the programming cycle’s tools, the 
planning vision is still rather focused on input represented by financial resource 
that State needs for its institutional purposes. 
 
 
  
Oppositely,  a new paradigm of State programming 
cycle, oriented to outputs and to Country’s strategic assets to 
develop, may be featured according to the following steps: 
a) State focuses on strategic resources’ assets 
responsible for the country’s economic development and 
additional financial resources for State. The underlying 
strategic horizon is evidently the long term since is related to 
assets and not to financial resources e.g. tax income. 
b) Policy makers implement policies in order to 
develop such strategic assets (performance drivers); 
Figure 10: Interaction among State’s programming cycle and strategies of enterprises and families 
Figure 11: A new 
programming cycle’s 
paradigm for the Italian 
State 
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c) Improvement and enrichment of society are given by “cash flows” 
(end results) of investments in strategic assets. Financial results are 
implemented to consolidate State’s financial accounts and invested once 
again in strategic resources by reiteration of the process, thus producing 
even more appreciable end results. 
The programming cycle paradigm will be further developed in Chapter 4 where 
it will be used as the base to design policies according to a “holistic development” 
approach. 
 
2.3.5. Ways by which budget allocation’s decisions are taken (issue 
common to most democracies). 
 
The last criticality concerns how decisions are taken in public institutions. The 
shape of such process may affect considerably not only the quality of policies 
implemented but also their budget allocation, and therefore their effectiveness. 
In the literature on public decisional processes, although the scientific debate is 
still fruitful and has not come to definitive conclusions, can be distinguished the 
three basic models explained below: 
a) the "rational” model and its variant "rational limited" 
This model sees at the center the rational decision maker that draws support 
from the disciplines of economics and management. Through systematic analysis 
he examines all possible alternatives and is able to calculate costs and benefits for 
each of the consequences. Then such decision maker chooses the alternative that 
has the most favorable cost-benefit ratio through an optimizing calculation 
(Mussari 2011). The model’s variant "rational limited”, proposed by Simon (1977), 
takes into account the human cognitive limitations in setting goals, knowledge of 
facts and in evaluating all possible alternatives. The choice made in this variant of 
the rational model is of type “satisfactory”, not optimizing. 
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b) the incremental model  
This model, designed by Lindblom, is based on a “polycentric approach” to 
decisional processes, typical of public programming choices where converge 
several interest groups. The decision-making process does not move from the 
objectives to be achieved with a public policy, but from existing policies that have 
resulted into an agreement (Mussari 2011). The decision covers, therefore, only 
incremental changes and adjustments with respect to an existing policy and 
descends from subsequent limited comparisons. The number of alternatives 
considered is reduced and the analysis is never exhaustive. The incremental 
adjustments concern not only the choice of policies but also the definition of the 
goals that are always recalculated according to the means available to solve them.  
Compared to the rational model, the focus is only on the short-term and on the 
more significant consequences of the decisions. The influence of the rigor of 
rational procedure on the decision is not relevant since the decision is made on an 
agreement on alternatives readily available and the best choice is the one on which 
it can be founded a deal. 
c) the mixed model (mixed scanning). 
This model, proposed by Etzioni (1967), distinguishes the decisions to be made 
in two categories: fundamental and non-fundamental. The first requires a decisional 
model of “rational” type. While the second, to be taken within the framework 
defined by the first, may be taken through an “incremental” approach. This model 
obviously leaves unsolved the problem of how to determine whether a decision is 
critical or not (Mussari 2011). 
From an immediate comparison of public decisional processes, it can be stated 
undoubtedly that the reference model of Italy, as well as the most of democracies, 
is the “incremental” one. Although the model’s "polycentric" approach represents 
its main strength, especially in a pluralistic society where converge different and 
often conflicting interest groups, this presents significant shortcomings.  As pointed 
out by Yehezkel Dror (1964), this is a model that leads to decide on issues not 
fundamental. Promoting changes in short-term and adjustments, this model 
reinforces the inertia and the path dependence from past policies and, being keeper 
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of the established order, this blocks innovation in redefining country’s strategic 
policies. Furthermore, the “incremental” decision model is affected by the 
distortion, even in the context of goals definition, created by the fact of giving 
more power to those better organized in terms of political and media popularity, 
leaving out those who are scarcely or nothing represented. 
 
2.4. A recent example of State policy’s failure in Italy 
 
The car overtax, named “Superbollo” was introduced by the Italian State in 
July 2011 with the aim of producing new financial resources to cover part of its 
midyear financial deficit. The new tax consists in an extra amount of 10 euro to pay 
for each kW of vehicle power exceeding the threshold of 225 kW
11
, with a 
retroactive effect on the entire existing fleet. From January 1
st
 2012, the overtax 
was increased to 20 euro per kW and extended to vehicles with power exceeding 
185 kW. 
The associations ANFIA (Italian car manufacturers), ANIASA (car rentals), 
Assilea (car leasing), Federauto (car dealers), UNASCA (agencies), UNRAE 
(foreign manufacturers) has indicated that according to Government’s forecasts the 
fiscal provision would have brought every year to Italian State an additional tax 
income of 168 million euro (UNRAE 2013). But it did not happen. 
The cause of this damage to the Tax Agency: a series of unforeseen and 
counterproductive phenomena, triggered by the measure, in particular: 
a) Collapse of new registrations of cars with power exceeding 185 kW:  
-35 % in 2012 against a -19.8% recorded by the car market as a whole (Anfia 
2013) ; 
b) Proliferation, in northern Italy, of cars with a "false leasing", i.e. cars 
with a German number plate (or Czech one) rented from commercial entities 
and used by Italian customers. This has resulted in a failure to pay VAT, car 
                                                 
11
 The “Superbollo was introduced by the article 23 of Decree 98/2011. 
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tax, car overtax, IPT (provincial tax on car registration), fines, provincial 
overtax on car insurance, and the impossibility of impounding cars registered 
abroad, the difficulties of carry out roadside checks and to establish 
responsibility in case of accidents.  
c) The boom of plate radiation for export purpose for both new and 
used cars, then circulating in Italy with a foreign plate, which do not produce 
anymore tax income for the Italian State. Export data shows in 2012 volumes 
more than doubled for cars exceeding 185 kW, +115% from about 13,000 
units in 2011 to nearly 29,000 in 2012 (ANFIA, 2013). 
d) The collapse of the changes of ownership related to cars exceeding 
185 kW (and the related tax income for State), a 37% reduction in 2012 
compared to the volumes of 2011 (Unrae, 2013). 
Even in its first year of implementation, in 2012, the car overtax determined a 
total loss of about 140 million of euro, broken down as follows: a) -93 million euro 
of VAT revenue; b) -13 million euro of car overtax for State; c) -19.8 million euro 
of car tax for Regions; d) -5.2 million euro of car registration tax; e)  approximately 
-9 million euro of overtax on car insurance (UNRAE 2013). According to the 
author such total loss is even higher in light of the loss of tax income for the State, 
resulting from lower tax income on profits of car manufacturers, dealerships and 
after-sales services (repair shops, etc.). 
Therefore, the overtax introduced, in addition to adversely affect both the 
market of new and used cars, has been producing adverse effects for the Treasury, 
not only in terms of overtax income forecasted, but also in terms of tax income 
loss. This been originating from lower earnings of the automotive sector’s 
enterprises, a loss in tax on plate registration, car tax, and other taxes resulting from 
the reduction in vehicle registrations and in existing fleet.  
Although the data of this policy do not need to be commented, an analysis on 
the process of its formation and implementation can help the reader to understand 
better how the programming cycle’s criticalities described in this chapter act in 
determining the failure of public policies. 
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First of all, there is no an ex-ante evaluation of the fiscal provision, in terms of 
effects regarding not only the single measure per se, but also the sector concerned. 
Evidently, this law does not take into account the totality of the policies already 
adopted by the State towards the automotive sector. Surely the effects would have 
been very different if that provision had concerned a sector not affected by a 
critical burden of regulations and taxes. Such sector was already affected by a fuel 
cost among the highest in Europe, where taxes represent 59% and 55% of the price 
of the final product, respectively for gasoline and diesel (AdnKronos 2013). Other 
taxes are related to all along car life: car tax (paid yearly), the exorbitant taxes on 
car insurances, on plate registration and ownership transfers. This is combined with 
a low deductibility of expenses for vehicles, currently at 20% out of the costs 
sustained. 
An ex ante evaluation which does not take into account the reactions of citizens 
and businesses to the new law provision enacted, makes it hard to believe the 
sustainability of forecasts made at the time of programming. Moreover, in this case 
is still missing an ex post evaluation of the law provision’s effects. The impact of 
the policy adopted was not analyzed by an independent body of State, or by the 
Ministry of Economic Development. The initiative of policy’s evaluation has been 
taken by the trading and manufacturers associations mentioned above that have 
showed for the Italian State a financial loss of 308 and 140 million euro with 
respect to Government’s forecast and tax income before the introduction of the 
overtax. 
The policy does not show even a strategic horizon that goes beyond the 
national boundaries. The fact that this policy has been implemented in Italy, 
regardless of his membership in the European Union and, therefore, of the policies 
adopted in other countries, confirms the hypothesis discussed in the paragraphs 1.2 
and 2.3.3 concerning the State’s policy horizon. 
This fact brings us to the theme of the fourth criticality of State’s programming 
cycle: the exclusive focus on inputs. The introduction of the car overtax is justified 
by a midyear financial deficit of State and does not create incentives for the 
development of the sector on which State may gain more in the long term. Nor is it 
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focused on Country’s stock of strategic resources, among which the luxury cars’ 
sector excels for its oldest tradition and its best know how worldwide. 
Not being focused on Country’s strategic assets and without an ex-post analysis 
of the policy’s feedback, the State may be likely concentrated in the next 
programming cycle to introduce additional tax to cover not only the past deficit of 
financial resources but also that of new loss generated by the tax provision adopted. 
Thus, for the case analyzed the financial deficit to cover will be not anymore 168 
million but 308 million euro. 
The last key critical item deals with the public decisional process. Such 
process, as mentioned above, is of type “incremental”. The decision covers only 
incremental changes and adjustments with respect to the existing policy. Compared 
to the rational model, the focus is only on the short term and on more significant 
immediate consequences of the decisions, the rigor of rational logics is of little 
importance in influencing the decision. The decision is made on an agreement on 
alternatives readily available as the settlement of a tax. 
The failure of the policy in question, as well as many others, is thus linked to 
the five criticalities described in this chapter and highlights two main gaps of the 
programming cycle of the Italian State. The first concerns the lack of a rigorous 
policy evaluation, while the second the informative basis necessary to design the 
policy itself.  
In order to fill such gaps the next chapter introduces the System dynamics 
methodology as a tool to design and test sustainable State’s policies. This 
methodology has been firstly applied to illustrate the figures in the game in a poor 
public strategizing, both for the Italian State and for enterprises (Chapter 3). 
Secondly such methodology has been applied in order to design a sustainable 
recovery strategy for the Italian economy and State finances. The results from such 
policy implementation are  illustrated in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MODEL 
 
3.1.  Beyond the public policies’ criticalities: enhancing the performance 
management systems through computer aided simulation models. The System 
dynamics methodology 
 
Why using simulation models in public policies? The reason is simple: testing 
ex ante their results and their implementation in order to reduce the risk to fail and 
to harm society. A simulation model requires a specification of objectives, 
hypothesis, relationships, means, a scrutiny of results and implementation issues of 
a policy. If well done, simulation models allow to create objective and transparent 
informative basis on which to set up the decisional processes. 
Whether the previous benefits are also achievable by using the common 
planning tools, two reasons make indispensable the use of simulation models, first  
of System dynamics ones: 
a) Solution of complex and dynamics problems: problem can 
arise by interactions of tens of variables and by circular causality 
relationships among them. This contrasts with the current mental model 
reasoning in terms of “instantaneous relationships” (A causes B). System 
dynamics models keep into account at the same time interactions of all 
variables and their causal relationships. 
b) As showed in Figure 12, simulation models reduce drastically the time 
and resources employed in order to plan and control and design 
sustainable policies. Oppositely to long and costly processes, the 
simulations and the test ex ante of policies through the use of System 
dynamics models enable not only the fast definition/redefinition of the 
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strategies to pursue but also a speed decision making based on an 
objective and trustful information.  
Strategies
Decision
Results
Feedback
Simulation
testModel
results
 
Figure 12: Time and resources saving in planning and control enabled by System dynamics models  
 
The System dynamics methodology, by which has been tested the effectiveness 
of the following “co-strategy” approach in public strategizing, is a new 
management tool trying to identify and test policies for dynamic problems. Such 
problems are known to arise from the mutual interaction and circular causality 
among variables, concerning a particular issue. Nowadays, System dynamics 
covers large breadth of applications (social, managerial and economic systems) and 
is based on a multidisciplinary approach. 
According to Sterman (2001), the main steps along which the present issue is 
developed can be synthesized as follows:  
a) Definition of the dynamic problem: this consists in portraying the 
behaviour of the concerned variable as recorded in a selected time 
period, e.g. the national enterprises’ delocalization occurred over the 
last decade.  
b) Construction of  the dynamic hypothesis: these concern the variables 
responsible for the problematic behaviour and for the causal 
relationships among them (specified by equations). This is the step of 
model building and its output is represented by the construction of a 
behavioral model capable of reproducing, by itself, the dynamic 
problem of concern.  
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c) Model analysis: this ensures that the model produces realistic and 
predictable behaviour of the analyzed variable, since only a reliable 
model we have confidence with can be used for managing the issue and 
testing the effectiveness of future policies.  
d) Policy design and implementation: policies are designed and tested in 
order to modify the dynamics producing the problematic behaviour of 
the specific variable analyzed. Each policy has to be tested and verified 
in terms of achievability and fairness and, if it involves any 
modification in the model structure, it has to be tested as mentioned to 
the previous step for model analysis. 
 
3.2 The Dynamic problem 
 
Heaven is just few kilometers across the border. The prospects are attractive, a 
paradise just two hours and a half from home: 7 days for a building permit, 80 days 
for an industrial plant, a more lenient Tax agency, and lower employer’s social 
security contributions. Flexibility of work, that allows dismissing with a notice 
period of six weeks, and a State that finances up to 25% of investments, and lower 
taxes for investments in R&D. This is the case of Austria, placed at the boundary of 
the most industrialized region of Italy. Austria is part of the European Union and 
the Schengen agreement allows, from 1995, the free circulation of people, goods, 
and enterprises within the European Union. So far 1,100 Italian companies have 
invested 26 billion euro in Austria and Italy represents the second foreign investor 
in the country after Germany. 
Over the last two decades delocalization has acquired a global extension. If in 
the common sense such phenomenon is linked to cost economies,  during the 
current crisis the list of companies going abroad in search of a simplification of 
labor requirements, better infrastructures and of a more efficient bureaucracy has 
become longer and longer. 
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A lower competitive advantage of Italy and consequently its lower 
attractiveness for foreign investors, affects directly the dynamic of FDIs’ inflows, 
as illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: FDIs inflow in Germany, Spain, France and Italy from 2000 to 2010. Elaboration on data 
Eurostat 
 
The FDIs inflows represent a litmus paper of the economic attractiveness of the 
country. The figure above shows the pattern of inward FDI for Italy and its 
neighboring industrial countries Germany, Spain, and France, from 2000 to 2010. 
France, despite its population size similar to Italy experiences the 300% more 
inward FDI than Italy, and the 4% more than Germany whose population is 20 
million more than France. Roots of the phenomenon can be traced mainly in the 
strong and effective administrative and legal framework of French institutions, 
good infrastructural assets, and in the incredibly low cost of electricity.  
Figure 14 shows dynamics of inward and outward FDIs flows related to Italy 
from 1986 to 2004. It can be easily argued that until 1992 the Italian economy has 
been appealing in the world economic scenario. From that time the Italian State has 
showed rather a indolence to endow the country of strategic assets to face up the 
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new global competitive scenario. Thus enterprises and FDI have acted 
consequently by moving out from the Country. 
 
Figure 14: Evolution of active and passive delocalization in manufacturing from 1986 to 2004. 
Elaboration on data Istat.  
 
As a consequence of lesser and lesser FDIs inward and a strong delocalization, 
for a minor competitive advantage of being localized in the country, the State 
organization is compulsorily squeezed, in lack of a sufficient tax income, between 
a welfare cut-off and a tax increase. The figure below shows dynamics of tax 
pressure in Italy from 2001 to 2012 (Istat 2013).  
 
Figure 15: Tax pressure in Italy in % of GDP. Source: Istat 2013 
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Italian policy makers seem to ignore the long term consequences of the 
delocalization phenomenon representing the dynamic problem analyzed in the 
present study. The consequences are displayed by Figure 16 that illustrates the 
mobility of enterprises, goods, and FDI in the case of an inefficient organizational 
and legal framework compared to that other countries.  
Enterprises
Goods
FDI
- LT STATE’S RECEIPTS
+ LT TAX RATES
- FUTURE WELFARE
 
Figure 16: Mobility of enterprises, goods and foreign investments according to the localization’s 
advantages 
 
In an open economic space, market players allocate their activity according to 
the competitive advantage offered by the localization area. In the case analyzed, if 
lesser will be the advantage of operating in Italy, because of higher production 
costs, lesser will be receipts, public investments for State organization and more 
tax rates in the long term for private institutions, thus eroding the development 
degree achieved in the past. The issue will be further developed in the following 
chapter in which dynamic hypothesis will be identified in order to explain the 
causal relationships below the dynamic problem. 
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3.3. The Dynamic hypothesis 
 
Explaining the dynamics of enterprises’ financial flows and their relationships 
with public finances could be a very difficult task, while the construction of a 
System dynamics model could better improve the comprehension of them. As 
suggested by the economic doctrine, the starting point of the following speculative 
process will be the recipients of the State organization’s activity (Simon 1947, 
Gulick et al. 1937), i.e. the enterprises in the case analyzed. The strategizing 
process of State should start with an analysis of how human needs are currently 
satisfied according to its mission. Such analysis is necessary to obtain at least the 
basic level of information defined by the “5W1H” methodology, i.e. who-when-
where-why-what-how (Kipling 2004, Dereli and Durmusoglu 2010). This 
methodology defines questions whose answers are considered basic in information 
gathering in order to be able to design a policy consciously. 
The model thus starts with a focus on enterprises’ activity in order to explain 
how the Italian State’s organizational and legal framework affects their activity, 
their localization strategies and the financial performance of the Italian State. The 
next Causal Loops Diagram (CLD) will show the enterprise’s business cycle in 
order to focus on dysfunctions that should be solved by public policies.  
 
3.3.1. The Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) 
The business cycle is composed by three chronological phases: finance 
gathering, investment, and income generated by the business cycle. Such process is 
iterative and the reinforcing loop explains how 
more are the initial finances, then more will be 
the investments and consequently profits. 
Eventually, more profits increase finances of 
enterprise for a new cycle. Depending on the 
activity’s localization, this iterative process 
could generate more or less resources according 
Investment
FinanceIncome
Delays&costs
Hign tax rate
& production costs
Cost&scarce avaibility
+
+
+
R
Figure 17: Phases of business cycle 
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as the level of externalities (and their relative costs) generated by factors such as 
inefficient capital market, delays in obtaining authorizations, ever changing laws, 
higher taxes and logistic costs.  
When such externalities are low, the 
process produces more and more financial 
resources at every cycle and, how showed in 
Figure 18, more are the flows managed by the 
firm, then more will be its patrimonial 
consistence. 
At this point the business cycle‘s CLD could be extended by taking into 
consideration the following factors: a) establishment of a common market; b) no 
economic and legal barriers to mobility of enterprises, goods and people within it; 
c) State’s tax income; d) State’s fiscal and investments policies. 
Including the above mentioned factors, the following CLD in Figure 19 now 
includes not anymore one but four reinforcing loops, which are responsible for the 
behaviour of enterprise’s mobility and, consequently, for diminution of State’s tax 
income overtime. 
a) Reinforcing loop R1: lower profitability of enterprises located in 
Italy leads to lower investments, thus increasing the incapability to match the 
market demand instances, thus reducing even more enterprise profitability; 
b) Reinforcing loop R2: lower profitability of enterprises located in 
Italy decreases the dividends distributed to shareholders who decide to relocate 
the activity in another country, this decision reduces State receipts, thus 
increasing tax rates in order to “save the budget” and therefore reducing even 
more the profits for investors; 
c) Reinforcing loop R3: similar to the previous one, it concerns the 
decision of transferring the activity abroad because of incapability to satisfy the 
market demand in terms of requested quality/price (which depends on the level 
of investments). This, eventually, would decrease State’s tax income and 
increase tax rates, thus reduce profits. 
Investment 2
Finance 2
Income 2
Delays and costs
Hign tax rate and
production costs
Cost and
scarce avaibility
+
+
+
R
Figure 18: Business cycle with low 
externalities 
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d)  Reinforcing 
loop R4: a decrease in 
Italy’s enterprise stock 
leads to a decrease of 
State’s tax income; the 
State in order to “save 
the budget” invests less 
in infrastructure, thus 
increasing production 
and logistic costs, and 
decreasing profits for 
enterprises. 
Since the localization strategy is planned upon comparative costs-benefits 
analysis, the profits variable should not be considered in its absolute value but in 
comparison with its value obtainable by enterprises in foreign countries. 
 
3.3.2. The Stock and Flow Diagram (SFD) 
In the above paragraph have been highlighted the enterprises’ reasons beneath 
their localization strategy, and the way these locate their activity according to 
benefits obtainable in the localization area. In reality, in a globalized market, 
operators study continuously opportunities for making their products more 
competitive. Factors like technology, tax, and production costs related to the 
activity’s localization play important roles in defining the enterprise’s competitive 
strategy.  
Decisions of staying or of moving abroad are taken based on simulation of 
differential benefits obtaining in term of a more competitive product; this 
expression is not strictly referred to low production costs but includes meanings 
like quality, possibility of differentiation, logistic costs, etc.  
The following model, portraying a small production enterprise operating in 
Italy which explores the possibility to localize its activity abroad, provides a clear 
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Figure 19: Causal Loop Diagram of enterprises’ mobility and 
State’s tax income 
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and useful explanation of dynamics described in the previous chapter. The great 
value added of the following SFD, compared to other simulations, is the iterative 
process of the enterprise’s business cycle. Whether, as in most of the countries, it is 
quite uncommon to stumble upon public policy makers acquainted with short term 
consequences of their policies, this become exceptional when one focuses on long 
term results of them. This is possible only with the awareness of their cause-effects 
relationships on the iterative business cycle, which enterprises know very well. 
Public remains rather focused on instant relationships among variables as 
exemplified by Figure 20. 
State's financial needs Taxes
Revenues
Qinvestments
Higher
taxes
+
?
?
 
Figure 20: Public and private approach in policy design 
The aim of the model provided is to benefit public policy makers with 
knowledge of such iterative process, fundamental of any sustainable economic 
strategy, since a “less hospitable” environment for enterprises could result in 
delocalization of them and thus less future State’s tax income.   
As mentioned in the introduction, the model portrays the activity of a small 
enterprise operating in Italy in order to focus on main dysfunctions that such 
enterprise faces up: 
a) High interest rates for financing investments and deposit advances; 
b) Delays in obtaining authorizations and cashing accounts receivables from 
Public administration;  
c) Logistic costs: availability of infrastructures (railways, motorways, ports, 
airports);  
d) Utilities costs;  
e) Costs for work unit and social security tax;  
f) Jurisdictional delay in settling commercial disputes;  
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g) Tax and administrative compliance;  
h) Taxes on profits; 
i) Real estate taxes. 
The enterprise produces a top quality food, with the average unit cost of 3,3 
euro, while the average price unit is 4 euro. The enterprise invests each year in new 
equipment and R&D in order to obtain good results in terms of quality, product 
differentiation, product price and reputation. 
The model is composed by three sections simulating: the enterprise’s activity 
in Italy, the comparative analysis of benefits and its decision to move abroad, and 
the tax income performance of the Italian State. 
 
 
Section 1: simulation of a small production enterprise operating in Italy 
In order to simplify as much as possible the description of the model, the 
enterprise activity simulated has been split into four sectors: a) Goods production 
& distribution; b) Financial dynamics; c) Income statement & profits’ utilization; 
d) Investments and their outputs in terms of efficiency and product quality. 
a) Goods production & distribution 
The following model’s sector includes all variables and dynamics involved in 
the enterprise’s production process. The enterprise fulfills by shipment the products 
requested by the market (an average of 38,462 per week); the production is 
fashioned according to the product quantity desired in inventory (100,000 units). 
Figure 21: Logical representation of model sections 
 56 
 
Raw material is ordered according to the desired quantity of the same inventory 
(150,000). Electricity consumption is fixed to 77 MWh per week at the price of 192 
€/MWh. The productivity of total workforce (production, logistic, maintenance, 
administrative) has been set to 1,154 products per week, its unit’s cost per month to 
1,800 euro plus 705 euro of social security tax. 
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Figure 22: Sector of Goods production & distribution 
 
Shipment costs for ordering raw materials and shipping final products have 
been set considering a cost per km of 0.626 euro (including tolls, driver and fuel 
costs in Italy). The average transportation has been set as 241 km for raw material 
and 1,228 for the final product (because of exportation). The average container 
filling is 4,200 products. 
Total administrative expenses have been set to 350,000 euro per year (6,731 
per week). 
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b) Financial dynamics 
Enterprise’s invoiced sales are cashed at different times, depending on terms 
and conditions established with the customers, on delays in cashing from public 
organizations, and on difficulty to cash credits through commercial disputes. The 
30% of sales is cashed immediately. The balance collection proceeds along three 
ways: the 40% is cashed within 8 weeks, the 45% is cashed through six months 
banks’ anticipations, the 15% of turnover proceeds along, in the worst case, a 
commercial case for its collection.  
The last two ways are extremely costly in term of interest (anticipation) and 
time (1210 days the average duration of a commercial case in Italy
12
). 
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Figure 23: Sector of Financial dynamics 
 
While the sales’ encashment increases cash, this last is reduced by payments, at 
their redemption time, of product and personnel cost, tax liabilities, interest 
                                                 
12
Source: ADNKronos 2012. 
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expenses, redemption of bank loans and anticipated invoices. In addition, the 
model includes the dynamics of bank loans’ subscription when the cash stock 
decrease under the desired minimum amount (100,000 euro). Bank loans and 
anticipations affect the enterprise’s profitability through the interest expenses paid 
on both types of financing. 
c) Income statement & profits’ utilization 
The following model’s sector reproduces, through a System dynamics 
approach, the net profit calculation in accordance with the current laws concerning 
the income statement formulation. The stock titled “pretax earnings” is increased 
by only Invoiced sales inflow and it decreases by means of product direct costs, 
personnel costs, operating expenses and interest outflows.  
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Figure 24: Sector of Income statement 
The taxation outflow originates from subtracting all costs and expenses of the 
enterprise. In Italy, taxation, particularly onerous, includes mainly three types of 
taxes:  
a) IRES
13, tax rate on company’s profits, nowadays worth 27,5% of pretax 
earnings;  
b) IRAP
14
, a tax rate of 3,9% on a taxable basis made up of pretax earnings, 
personnel cost, and a part of interest expenses;  
c) IMU, the tax rate on real estate oscillating between 0.7% and 1% of the such 
assets’ market value. 
                                                 
13
Imposta di Reddito delle Società. 
14
Imposta di Reddito sulle Attività Produttive. 
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As showed by Figure 25, 
profits are accumulated in 
the stock “retained earnings” 
and, after passing the budget 
(in Italy by 30
th
 of April), the 
shareholders’ meeting 
approves the destination of 
earnings. In the model, a 40% of them are distributed as dividends, a 50% are 
allocated for investment and the remaining 10% for increasing the stock of cash. 
d) Investments and their output of efficiency and product quality 
The dynamics of investments in tangible and intangible assets have been 
included in the model since they represent the link between present results and 
future performance perspectives, based on the asset’s quantity and quality. Such 
link, often missing in the strategizing process of a State organization, allows the 
present model to reproduce the iterative process showed in the above Causal Loop 
Diagram, with extraordinary correspondence to the reality.  
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Figure 26: Sector of investments and their output of efficiency and product quality 
 
price per unit
property
 & plants
quality
increase
ef f iciency  
increase
initial quality
init ef f iciency
Intangible
assets
Earnings
dividends
investments
Shareholders
meeting
remun
fraction
inv fraction
cash invest
cash fract
Figure 25: Sector of profits’ utilization 
 60 
 
Earnings allocated for the investments, in the measure of 50% as approved by 
the shareholders’ meeting, are collected and divided to effect three types of 
investments: a) replacement of equipment according to their depreciation of 10% 
per year; b) 85% of the remaining sum is invested in R&D; c) the rest in plants’ 
efficiency. 
Except for equipment’s replacement, investment activity is affected by delays. 
In the model these have been set to 52 weeks for R&D and 3 years for plants 
because of the average time elapsed in Italy to obtain all authorizations to 
build/modify an industrial plant. 
The outputs of investment’s activity have been synthesized by two variables: 
a) Quality increase: for intangible assets, it affects the price premium that 
customers recognize to a more qualitative product; 
b) Efficiency increase: this concerns investments in plants or their 
improvement and it influences variables such as workforce productivity and 
utilities’ cost. 
 
Section 2: The comparative analysis of localization benefits and the decision to 
move abroad 
As mentioned before, enterprises constantly do comparative localization costs 
analysis in order to make their products more competitive in terms of cost and 
quality, and to obtain more benefits in terms of dividends and investments. 
Such analyses are done by simulations of possible additional benefits that 
enterprises could reach by being localized abroad. In order to reproduce this 
benefits, in this section the activity abroad of the Italian enterprise has been 
simulated by keeping into account the same parameters described above, i.e. by 
considering raw material consumption, technology and workforce productivity as 
set in section 1 of the model. So the present model’s section has the same structure 
of that described in Section 1. Thus, in the comparative simulation enterprise takes 
into consideration only the dysfunctional factors mentioned in this chapter, whose 
Table 4 reports both the values for Italy and for the foreign countries benchmarked 
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by the enterprise (Austria and Germany because of their proximity to Italy and their 
appreciable State’s efficiency).  
Table 5: List of parameters that enterprise includes in its differential analysis 
Variables' list units ITALY EU (A/D)
Interest rates on long term loans % 6,24 3,49
Interest rate deposit advances % 4,86 2,56
Time to obtain authorization days 730 80
Time to cash from public organization days 193-269 45
Infrastructure quality and availability 0-1 0,9 1
Tolls per km eur 0,136 0
Fuel cost (per liter) eur 1,76 1,50
Cost of power per MWh eur 192 125
Salary per work unit (per month) eur 1800 2100
Social security per work unit (per month) days 705 462
Av. time to settle commercial disputes days 1210 273
Time of tax and burocracy compliance days 119 70
Tax on profits % 32* 25
Real state tax  % EV 0,01 0,005**
Variables used for differential analysis
* It includes IRAP rate     ** Extimation  
 
According to the simulation’s results obtained through the values of variables 
included in the previous list (that not pretends to be exhaustive) the entrepreneur 
takes into consideration the opportunity to delocalize abroad. He deepens its 
comparative analysis for a short or long period of time depending not only on 
amount of differential benefits that he could achieve by delocalization, but also on 
his social commitments and personal reasons. Such reasons have been included in 
the following model’s section in Figure 27 through provision of the variable 
“PS1/PS2” that synthesizes the pressure determined by such reasons on the 
entrepreneur’s mind. The economic incentive to delocalize is counteracted by the 
entrepreneur’s social commitment and personal reasons (family etc.). When the 
economic incentives to delocalize are low, the entrepreneur decides to remain in 
Italy since its social commitment and personal reasons have a dominant effect. 
Otherwise, when the economic incentives to delocalize are high, these will have a 
dominant effect in the entrepreneur’s mind and he will eventually delocalize. The 
model simulates by setting to 15% this critical threshold in terms of additional 
profits. If the economic incentive to delocalize overcomes such threshold the 
entrepreneur will eventually delocalize. 
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Figure 27: Entrepreneur’s and FDI’s decisional model of localization  
 
Dynamics of FDI work in an easier fashion. After a deep what-if analysis of the 
social-economic environment and the benefits offered by States of a concerned 
area, FDI move in the State offering a higher marginal benefit. In the model FDI 
increase either the stock of Italy’s enterprises or that of enterprises moved to UE. 
Attraction and loosing rates define the rapidity of movement according to such 
marginal benefits. Stock of Italy’s enterprises has been set to the initial value of 
223,494. This is the number of enterprises with more than 19 employees in 2012 
(ISTAT 2013). The model does not include, because not of concern, the dynamics 
of Italian enterprises’ birth rate. 
 
Section 3: tax income performance of the Italian State 
Third section of the model includes the impact of the enterprises’ localization 
strategy on State finances. The left side of the section provides an useful 
comparison of fiscal policy effectiveness between the Italian and the foreign State 
at constant stock of enterprises. Instead, the right side, including dynamics of 
enterprises’ delocalization and FDI flows, quantifies Italy’s tax income losses with 
the current legal and organizational framework and fiscal policies. 
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Figure 28: Italy’s fiscal policy effectiveness & tax income losses  
 
This is the focus point of the model putting in evidence the absolute necessity 
for the Italian State to adopt a new strategizing approach in order to implement 
sustainable financial and development policies. So far, the change in the strategic 
scenario, caused by the EU economic and political integration, has not been 
seriously taken into account. By blindly pursuing this way State will lose 
competitiveness, finances and welfare. 
 
3.4. Model analysis 
 
The model provided in this paper needs to produce real and predictable 
behavior. In order to ensure it, model analysis has to be done since only a reliable 
model we have confidence with can be used for making policy makers aware of 
how to manage sustainably country finances in period of crisis.  
Model analysis consists mainly on seven tests (Sterman 2000), as mentioned 
below: 
1) Unit consistency test: a model which has inconsistent units is usually not 
only trustless but also worthless (Sterman 2000); 
2) “Face validity” test: model has to reflect how things work in reality; 
3) Equilibrium shock test: it identifies and fixes incorrect equations (Ford 
2010); 
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4) Extreme conditions test: by setting parameters to extremes conditions, it 
seeks to identify and fix wrong or incomplete equations; 
5) Reference mode comparison test: this checks the correspondence of 
simulated variable’s behaviour to the one recorded in reality for a 
determinate period of time; 
6) Parameter sensitivity test: it evaluates model response to parameters’ 
variation; 
7) Structure-behavior test: it shows how each feedback loop operates creating 
endogenous variation of model’s stocks. 
All of mentioned tests have been carried out for the model provided. In the 
present chapter will be described only the structure-behaviour test, since in the 
author’s opinion it provides a better comprehension of how model works and 
simulates the behaviour of variables involved in the issue analyzed. Test results 
will be described below according to the scheme outlined in the dynamic 
hypothesis chapter. In order to provide also a comparison between the “localization 
in Italy” scenario and the “localization abroad” one, the majority of test results will 
be exposed through graphs including two curves illustrating the simulation’s results 
for each scenario.  
 
a) Goods production & distribution 
Figure 29 shows the dynamics of raw material inventory and how orders of 
them are placed by the enterprise according to its desired inventory (150,000). 
When inventory goes below the desired level, orders are placed and are delivered to 
the enterprise by three weeks (equal to the distance between the blue line minimum 
and the red line maximum).  
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Figure 29 
Figure 30 shows, with equal conditions of quantities delivered and a small 
difference in delivering distances (lesser in the delocalization scenario), a 
comparison between the shipment costs sustained by operating in Italy (blue curve) 
and in case of delocalization (red one).  
Shipment of raw material is carried out according to orders placed (Figure 33), 
while shipment of final products is constant because steady is the products’ 
hypothesized demand 
per week. 
These different 
features of shipment 
determine two costs’ 
curves associated the 
first with a pulse shape, 
while constant the 
second one. In the 
delocalization scenario, 
shipment costs less. 
In Figure 31, cost of personnel is compared to the same number of employees 
and unit productivity in both scenarios. Although in Italy (pink curve) personnel 
costs include a higher social security contribution, the total personnel cost is lower 
Cost of RM shipment
Page 1
1,00 92,00 183,00 274,00 365,00
Weeks
1:
1:
1:
2:
2:
2:
0
3008
6015
1: ship in cost 2: ship in cost 2
1
1
1
1 12 2
2
2 2
Figure 30 
 66 
 
than western European countries (green curve) since the wages are at least 15-20% 
lower.  
 
 
 Costs of personnel decrease according to an increase in its productivity given 
by the output of investments in plants’ efficiency as showed in paragraph d) of the 
Stock and Flow Diagram (SFD). In the delocalization scenario the enterprise 
invests more and increases faster the personnel productivity. This explains how 
personnel costs decrease faster in the delocalization scenario and, at the end of the 
period simulated, these are lower with respect to Italy. 
In Figure 32, 
electricity costs are 
analysed. Keeping 
constant the power 
consumption, in Italy 
(pink curve) electricity 
costs more than in the 
delocalization scenario 
(green curve). As 
described for the 
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personnel costs, the 
electricity costs 
decrease according to 
the output of 
investments in plants’ 
efficiency 
Figure 33 shows 
the comparison 
between the costs 
related to tax and 
bureaucracy compliance in Italy (blue curve) and in delocalization scenario (red 
curve). In Italy, proliferation of laws, fiscal duties, and a scarce orientation to the 
customer service of public agencies lead to an increase of this cost voice for 
enterprises.  
 
b) Financial dynamics 
In this paragraph, enterprise’s financial dynamics will be described. In 
particular, the analysis has been conducted on delays and costs related to the 
encashment of accounts receivable since they affects directly the abundance of 
liquidity or its absence.   
Figure 34 shows the comparison of accounts receivable behavior in both 
scenarios analyzed. Accounts receivable is a stock, it increases by invoiced sales 
and decrease by its encashment.  
With constant sales units and product price, in Italy’s scenario (blue curve) the 
stock is larger since enterprises experience longer delay in cashing beyond the 
normal delay accorded to customers.  
The graphs illustrated in Figure 35 and Figure 36 give evidence of the 
consequences of the two most problematic encashment delays concerning 
respectively the encashment from public organizations and the duration of disputes 
undertaken to recover credits. 
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15.06    mer 6 mar 2013
Cost for tax and bureaucracy compliance
Page 1
1,00 92,00 183,00 274,00 365,00
Weeks
1:
1:
1:
2:
2:
2:
0
300
600
1: tax & bureacracy compliance 2: tax & bureacracy compliance 2
1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
 68 
 
15.36    mer 6 mar 2013
Accounts receivable dynamics
Page 1
1,00 92,00 183,00 274,00 365,00
Weeks
1:
1:
1:
2:
2:
2:
0
897500
1795000
1: Accounts  receivable 2: Accounts  receivable 2
1
1 1 1 1
2
2 2 2
2
 
Figure 34 
 
 
Figure 35 
 
Figure 35 shows dynamics of invoices bank anticipation. This praxis is quite 
common in Italy, since the average delay in cashing from public organization often 
overcomes the threshold of 250 days (Confartigianato 2012). This explains how the 
stock’s value in the Italy’s scenario (blue curve) is almost the double of 
delocalization one (red curve). 
Instead, Figure 36 illustrates dynamics of credits to be recovered through 
disputes in judicial institutions. In the model, they are represented by a stock where 
inflow consists in the amounts of credit to recover through disputes, while its 
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outflow in the amount of credits recovered through disputes settled. Setting in the 
model the same percentage of bad debts (15% of total accounts receivable), Italy 
scenario (blue curve) presents a larger stock compared to the one of delocalization 
(red curve). This essentially depends on the unsustainable delay of Italian justice in 
settling  commercial disputes: 1210 days the average duration against an average of 
273 days in the delocalization scenario (ADNKronos 2012).  
 
Figure 36 
Longer encashment delays not only affect the enterprise’s financial 
equilibrium, i.e. its liquidity level, but also the economic one by mean of interests 
paid on loans to increase its liquidity. This means that such higher delays increase 
the amount of loans that enterprise acquires to increase its liquidity level when 
needed, and its related interest expenses as well. The following two figures 
illustrate dynamics of cash and bank loans in the Italy’s scenario (Figure 37) and in 
delocalization one (Figure 38). In both scenarios initial bank loans stock has been 
set to the value of 5 million euro.  
When cash (or bank accounts) goes below the desired amount (fixed in the 
model to 100,000 euro), the enterprise acquires new bank loans (in the model has 
been included a contractual/negotiation delay of 4 weeks). Redemption of loans is 
done according to their amortization plan and enterprise’s available liquidity. 
Model shows that bank loans increase when cash decreases under the desired 
threshold and decrease only when cash is over it. 
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Figure 38 
The comparison of scenarios portrayed in the Figures 37 and 38 depicts a crude 
reality: in the Italy’s scenarios the enterprise presents a more vulnerable financial 
equilibrium. This presents poorer cash cycles and, after a period of seven years, it 
has paid back only the 55% of its initial loans against the 80% in the delocalization 
scenario. 
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c) Income statement & profits’ utilization 
Figure 39 
illustrates the 
comparison between 
revenues, expressed 
in euro, in Italy (blue 
curve) and in 
delocalization 
scenario (red curve). 
Sales units have been 
set constant in both 
of them. Similarly to what mentioned above for the output of investments in plants’ 
efficiency, unit price increase according to quality obtained from investments in 
R&D. 
Figure 40 provides an interesting analysis on the weekly interest expenses 
sustained by the enterprise operating in Italy (blue curve) and in the delocalization 
scenario (red curve). 
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Figure 40 
The remarkable difference in amounts depends essentially on two factors: a) 
higher interest rates paid on loans in Italy; b) larger amount of loans stock where 
interests are calculated and paid, this is due mainly to high delays in cashing debt 
from public organization and through judicial institutions.  
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Last critical point to mention in the analysis of the income statement is the 
level of taxation. The comparison in Figure 41 shows that in Italy (pink curve) the 
enterprise pays more taxes than abroad (green curve). Only with a remarkable 
increase of revenues, reached in the sixth year the enterprise abroad will pay more 
than one operating in Italy.  
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Figure 41 
 
The System dynamics model, based on the “stock and flow” relationships, 
contemplates the accumulation of net profits during the year. This representation is, 
however, more coherent with the reality: net profits are produced overtime and not 
when, at the end of the year, the enterprise proceeds to their calculation. Earnings 
stock decreases when the shareholders’ meeting approves the balance sheet and the 
earnings destination.  
Figure 42 thus provides a comparison between the stocks of earnings that 
enterprise produces in Italy (blue curve) and delocalizing abroad (red curve).  
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d) Investments and their output of efficiency and product quality 
This model’s sector reproduces dynamics of earning distribution after 
shareholders’ meeting. In the model, 40% of such earnings are distributed as 
dividends (blue curve) and 60% are destined to investments (red curve) in order to 
replace equipment, to invest in efficiency and in product quality. 
Figures 43 and 44 enlighten a remarkable difference on earnings distributed 
and invested in Italy (Figure 43) and in the delocalization scenario (Figure 44). 
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Figure 44 
Figure 45 illustrates stock of resources invested in R&D, whose inflow is 
represented by earnings destined to investment in intangibles, and outflow by their 
amount spent according to investments’ plan (enduring 52 weeks in both 
scenarios). In Italy’s scenario (blue curve) are invested fewer resources than in 
delocalization one (red curve). 
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Figure 45 
Stock of resources destined to investments in property and plants, in Figure 46, 
works in the same way as seen for R&D, with the only difference that this kind of 
investment is carried out with distinct delays between the two scenarios analyzed. 
In Italy (blue curve) the enterprise faces lower amounts invested and huge delays in 
obtaining all authorizations. This last issue has taken into consideration by the 
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model through a lower inclination of blue curve. It means that, even though there 
are sufficient resources to invest, investments are hindered by long delays of public 
agencies and need more time to be completed. 
Investment activity’s 
outcomes are included 
in the model. These 
represent the link 
between present 
performance and future 
perspectives of the 
enterprise’s success.  
Figures 47 and 48 
show respectively the 
outcomes of efficiency and quality increase simulated by the model. Higher 
investments allow the delocalized enterprise (red curve) to obtain more outcomes 
compared to one operating in Italy (blue curve). 
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Figure 47 
In the model efficiency and quality outcomes have influence respectively on the 
production costs and product appreciation by the market. While effects of the first 
one have been already analyzed in the description of production sector in terms of 
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more productivity and lower cost for utilities, those of the second one have been 
included in the model through the provision of the “product price” variable. 
In reality a higher quality also increases market demand, but in the model such 
relationship has not been included since it requires inclusion of further dynamics 
such as production capacity and scale economies not concerning the key issue 
analyzed in the present study. Figure 49 shows the unit price dynamics in the 
Italy’s scenario (blue curve) and in delocalization one (red curve).  
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Figure 48 
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e) The enterprise’s decisional model 
In the previous paragraphs have been described how inefficiency’s factors 
connected to the values of parameters listed in Table 4 affect the enterprise’s 
profitability not only in the short term, but also in the long run. This is due to the 
fact that enterprise, being an institution that operates overtime in order to satisfy 
efficiently and effectively human needs, seeks to achieve such mission through its 
investments activity (Sorci 2002). An enterprise that invests less, will not operate 
according to its mission and at the end will lose customers and profits.  This 
explains the reason why enterprises are oriented in seeking a long term competitive 
advantage, and why consequently public policies fail when are issued for 
consolidating State’s finances and do not take into consideration their effects on the 
iterative dynamics of enterprises’ activity. 
The model includes the enterprise’s decision to delocalize abroad in order to 
seek some competitive margin in the supply of products. As mentioned above, 
enterprises do simulations to know whether they can satisfy, with the current 
localization, market requirements, and face up global competition. Simulation of 
profits’ stock, which the enterprise could produce in Italy (blue curve) and abroad 
(red curve), during their simulation period, is illustrated by Figure 50. 
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Additional profits for the enterprise mean higher investments, and 
shareholders’ remuneration. Such opportunity acts in the entrepreneur’ mind as an 
incentive to delocalize. In the model, when profits in the delocalization scenario are 
at least 15% higher than those the enterprise produces in Italy, such opportunity 
will have a dominant effect on entrepreneur’s social commitment and personal 
reasons pushing him to delocalization. Such dynamics has been described in Figure 
51. The “PS1/PS2” ratio variable indicates the entrepreneur’s profits comparison 
(Profits in Italy/profits abroad).  
 
 
Figure 51 
 
3.5. The Italian State’s net tax income performance 
 
Last model’s section concerns the impact of the enterprises’ localization 
strategy on State finances. In order to provide a better comprehension between 
local focused policy horizon and a wider one, Figure 52 illustrates tax policy 
performances of the Italian and foreign States. This comparative test has been 
performed on the same enterprises’ stock (223,494 enterprises) and in hypothesis 
of absence of mobility. The graph shows receipt’s stock accumulated by the Italian 
and the foreign State during a period of seven years. 
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Figure 52 
The Italian State performance (blue curve) seems to be more effective for 
State’s finances. At the end of the period the Italian States cashes additional 
receipts for almost 100 billion euro. However, has it been adopted a correct 
strategic horizon? Is such policy sustainable?  
Figure 53 shows how, adopting a wider strategic horizon (beyond the 
geographic boundaries), and focusing correctly on enterprises activity, the current 
Italian fiscal policy is unsustainable.  Because of delocalization the State’s yearly 
loss, given by absence of tax income and more unemployment benefits multiplied 
by the number of delocalized enterprises, grows more and more.  
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Figure 54 
Figure 54 illustrates the accumulation of such loss in State’s tax income. This 
stock increases more and more according to a higher and higher yearly loss. 
Figure 55 allows to assess the sustainability of the “tax increase and cut public 
services and investments” policies adopted by several world’s countries, among 
which the Italian State. Since sustainability is a value that has to be assessed on the 
long term, the simulation’s horizon has been extended from 7 to 10 years and the 
long term performances of fiscal policies of the Italian and foreign States have been 
compared. Starting at week 1 from the same enterprises’ stock, the graph below 
shows the State’s receipts accumulation from both fiscal policies.  
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The Italian State tax income (blue curve) is in the short term higher than the 
foreign State, then is overcome by the last one. At the end of 10
th
 year, the foreign 
State has cashed 462 billion euro more than the Italian State. 
 
3.6.  Insights from model’s results 
 
Model’s quantitative results, obtained in a stock of 223,494 enterprises15 and 
below the hypothesis of an average workforce of 30 units per delocalized 
enterprise, report on a ten-yearly horizon a financial damage for the Italian State of 
about 462 billion of Euro, the 29.5% of national GDP, and the 23.2% of public debt 
in 2012 (Istat 2013). 
The model includes dynamically enterprises activity and demonstrates that the 
wealth of private institutions cannot anymore be considered as an independent 
variable in public strategizing. 
The “enterprises centered” research focus is completely new in the research 
scenario of public financial policies. Model quantitative results has outlined the 
necessity for public policy makers to adopt a wider horizon in strategizing, beyond 
the national boundaries and focusing on enterprises’ global competitiveness.  
Oppositely to the austerity policies aimed exclusively to consolidate State’s 
financial accounts, results obtained by model’s simulation make clear that the 
success of public policies passes undoubtedly by the valorization of 
collaboration with private firms for “co-creating” their global competitive 
advantage, and that of the country in which they operate. 
Therefore, in absence of such collaboration, long-term orientation in 
strategizing and a wider policy’s horizon, the Italian State risks to create 
unconsciously a huge harm to the whole society. 
 
                                                 
15
 This is the stock of enterprises with more than 19 employees in 2012 (ISTAT 2013). 
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CHAPTER 4 
  BEYOND THE STATE ORGANIZATION FINANCIAL 
STRATEGY: THE CONCEPT OF HOLISTIC DEVELOPMENT 
FOR A SUSTAINABLE STATE – TERRITORY 
STRATEGIZING AND SOCIAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1.  Introducing the concept of holistic development in “Azienda Italia” 
 
The analysis implemented so far in the present study has enlightened how the 
ineffectiveness of the public policies results from the gaps concerning both the 
methodology and the informative basis necessary to design public policies. In order 
to fill such gaps it has been introduced the System dynamics methodology as a tool 
to design and test sustainable State’s policies.  
The innovative standpoint of the model illustrated in Chapter 3 is the “market 
players centered” focus, because, in reality, the financial resources available for the 
State organization are a dependent variable of the welfare of economic players, and 
not independent as it is commonly intended in public strategizing. The model gives 
an evidence of the success of strategies targeted to the welfare of all stakeholders 
involved, by avoiding the benefits obtained by some stakeholders to detriment of 
the others.  
Such evidence introduces the concept of the “holistic development” strategy 
requiring that valid interests of each stakeholder need to be weighted in the 
strategies that State organization designs and implements in its territory. The Italian 
State is the sole entity that could be endowed of such authority. As it happens in 
private firms, the State organization should elaborate (according to its mission) 
specific strategies targeted to different internal divisions, strategic areas, and 
stakeholders. This requires to rethink the role of the Italian State and its 
relationships within the territory, not anymore as an entity that operates separated 
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from the reality in which is involved, but as the administrator of a specific 
enterprise: the Azienda Italia.  
In the Italian economic jargon the term “azienda” has been defined by Zappa 
(1957) as “an economic institution set to last overtime, that, for the satisfaction of 
human needs, orders and carries out in continuous coordination the production, the 
procurement and the consumption of wealth”. With respect to the term 
“enterprise”, mainly concerning the complex of assets and the pursuit of profit, the 
Italian meaning of “azienda” extends its focus beyond by including first of all the 
social function of an enterprise: the satisfaction of human needs.  
On the basis of the above mentioned considerations, the issue of the sustainable 
financial strategy of the Italian State is susceptible to be further extended by 
considering its consequences for the whole society. Thus this chapter introduces 
the concept of “holistic development” of organizations. This has been initially 
developed by the Business Management school of the University of Palermo, 
which has always been focused on organizations’ values as key factors of 
organizations’ success.  
The concept of “integral development” is based on the assumption that a single 
action pursuit by an entity, either an individual or an organization, produces four 
types of effects, or in other words it could be analyzed in its four dimensions (Sorci 
2007, Wojtyla 1982): 
- the action itself: it includes the immediate scope, the achievement of an 
objective result; 
- the intentional or reflective one: it includes the action’s capacity to 
improve or worsen the person or the entity that puts it into effect; 
- the relational one: the action’s capacity to improve or worsen the 
person or the entity who receives it; 
- the socio-environmental one: the action’s effects on the society and the 
economic environment. 
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Applying this concept to the above mentioned “Azienda Italia”, it could be 
argued that its holistic development occurs if State organization designs policies to 
obtain results along the following four dimensions:  
a)  the achievement of a good financial result; 
b) the internal dimension that such result has in terms of growth in values, 
knowledge, economic growth,  professionalism, work efficiency and cohesion; 
c) the external reflection over the recipients, for which the State organization 
must generate value; 
d) the positive reflection over the socio-economic and environmental context in 
which public strategies take place. Such dimension of the results is mainly 
responsible of the social capital development in the society. Good management, 
services and transparency foster in individuals their social commitments, honesty 
and solid relationships with people.  
The “holistic development” excludes the maximization of a single success’ 
dimension (e.g. profits, surplus in national accounts or public debt reduction) 
preferring an appreciable degree of achievement of all of them.  
Financial & Economic
Results
Socio-Economic &
Environmental dev.
Internal and External
Development
System of values inside State organization
Holistic development
of “Azienda Italia”
 Figure 56: The four dimensions and determinants of the holistic development 
The “holistic development” implies necessarily to broaden courageously the 
planning in public organization from the short term to the long term.  
This has more implications for public policy makers than it seems. In the short 
term, public policies are determined by immediate needs of the State organization 
and, rightly or wrongly, they do not imply strong responsibility for the actions 
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undertaken (everything could be justified by the constraints of the moment). 
Oppositely, in the long term, the public planning and control imply a commitment 
versus the society and make policy makers responsible for the achievement of 
planned goals. 
The holistic development does not concern only the State organization 
development, but also influences positively the whole society. This creates a 
virtuous circle where the State organization creates the “necessary conditions” for 
the development of all the institutions playing a role in building the global 
competitiveness of a country: a) public organizations; b) enterprises; c) families. At 
once, as illustrated by the following figures, such institutions will provide the State 
organization of additional inputs necessary for its activity: a) additional financial 
resources  generated by either an increase in tax income or lower public 
expenditures for unemployment benefits (see Figures 57 and 63); b) higher 
educated human resources in the public organizations’ management.   
Financial & Economic
Results
Socio-Economic &
Environmental dev.
Internal and External
Development
System of values inside State organization
Holistic development
of “Azienda Italia”
GLOBAL COMPETIVENESS
 
Figure 57: Causal relationships between global competitiveness and holistic development of  
“Azienda Italia” 
The “necessary conditions” for the development of all the institutions are 
clearly observable in the model showed in the previous chapter, where a simulation 
of long-term financial performance of the Italian State has demonstrated the direct 
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effects of Italy’s legal and organizational framework on performance of both 
enterprises and public organizations. 
The theory of the “holistic development” pushes for a step further in the 
conceptualization of the State organization as leader of the Country’s competitive 
success. These are not just words but it is something that, even if not yet fully 
theorized, is well understood by several States. If the environment influences the 
activity of organizations in terms of input, requirements and social commitments 
requested (Porter 1990), it is also true vice-versa through organizations’ output, 
progress and vision. This demonstrates that State organization should contribute 
actively to the society development and not consider enterprises and citizens as 
independent variables vis-à-vis strategy achievements. 
The “holistic development” approach, including the “external” and “social” 
dimensions of the State organization’s performance, requires to test before policy 
implementation whether public strategies affect positively performance of other 
society’s institutions (enterprises and families). Thus in this paragraph the analysis 
of consequences of public policies on enterprises (in Chapter 3) is extended to the 
society as a whole.  
For this purpose, the analysis follows by framing in a joint scheme the 
performance cycle of each type of institution according to the framework illustrated 
by Figure 11 (new paradigm for the State’s programming cycle). Each of the 
mentioned institutions has a determined stock of strategic resources that seeks to 
develop according to the end results of actions implemented for this purpose 
(performance drivers). The sum of all the strategic resources of institutions is 
comparable to the sum of country’s tangible and intangible assets, the sources of 
wealth of a country in the long term. 
Enterprises seek to develop their strategic resources by investing their profits, 
whose drivers are represented by technology adopted, human resources quality, 
taxes, legal and organizational framework in which they operate. 
Financial resources available for welfare and investments are the strategic 
resources of public organizations. They could be increased by financial results in 
term of tax income and savings in public expenditures, whose drivers are 
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respectively tax pressure leverage on the one hand, and efficiency and effectiveness 
in resources’ management on the other hand. 
Families’ strategic resource is represented by education, which is higher in the 
upper class families thanks to higher expenses dedicated to it. Education is the 
driver of a satisfactory remuneration and consequently of better living conditions. 
It can be easily argued from the figure below (Figure 58) that a stress in public 
organizations’ performance drivers (e.g.: tax pressure, inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness in resource management) affects directly the performance drivers of 
other institutions (red curves). This influence reduces end results of enterprises and 
families, consequently depleting their strategic resources in the long term and 
causing the country’s impoverishment as follows:  
A) Higher taxes and an inefficient legal and organizational framework, as 
demonstrated by the model in Chapter 3, reduce profits of enterprises, their assets’ 
endowment (caused by lower and lower investments) and eventually their presence 
within the national boundaries. Higher taxes also reduce, especially in time of 
crisis, families’ budget allocated to culture and education.  
 
 
 
Figure 58: Scheme of strategies undertaken by society’s institutions, their relationships, and 
consequences in terms of development/depletion of Country’s strategic resources. 
!WARNING!
Depletion of Country’s
Strategic resources
Impoverishment in progress
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B) These direct effects on performance drivers of other institutions create, at 
once, indirect effects due to causal relationships of second order (blue curves). 
Lower profits subjected to taxation reduce the financial resources available for 
public organizations to finance welfare and investments. These effects impact, as 
experienced in Italy during the last two decades, the taxation and the public budget 
for culture, education, infrastructures and facilities, key performance drivers of 
families and enterprises. A higher taxation as well as lower levels of education, 
infrastructures and facilities then influence the quality of human resources and the 
State’s legal organizational framework, key performance drivers of enterprises. 
Lower profits of enterprises foster their fragility and mobility abroad. The result of 
this domino effect reduces even more financial resources for public organizations 
and education expenses of families. At the end of a period of ten years, the strategic 
resources of enterprises, public organizations and families, assets of Country, may 
have been unknowingly depleted and the country may have lost the sources of its 
global competitiveness. 
The theory of the “holistic development” and its focus on the “internal”, 
“external” and “social” long term performance is targeted to the sustainable growth 
of organizations. As argued by Bianchi, such growth may be assessed under three 
perspectives: a) the internal one that “emerges from consistency between different 
subsystems, sectors and departmental/functional areas of the organization” 
(Bianchi 2012); b) the external one that derives from the three relevant success’ 
dimensions of organizations: financial, competitive and social (Coda 2010); c) the 
temporal one that includes consistency between long-term and short-term 
strategies. 
The three dimensions of a sustainable growth may be analyzed together by 
framing them into a tridimensional graph. The following figure (Figure 59) thus 
shows how the organization’s growth should be assessed in terms of sustainability. 
The sustainability of growth increases more and more when, at the same time, this 
occurs along the three following perspectives: 
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a) External: the focus of organization’s strategy evolves from the 
economic/financial performance to the valorization and/or building of 
sources of competitive advantages, then to social commitment; 
b) Internal: the organization strategy evolves from the performance a single 
department/functional area to the harmonious development of all of them 
within the strategic business areas; 
c) Temporal: from a focus on short-term strategies to the development of the 
key-variables responsible of the organization’s success in the long-term. 
As mentioned above, such perspectives should be considered together, and the 
sustainable growth of all of them occurs according to the path marked out by the 
red half-line in Figure 59. 
  
 
The sustainable growth is thus a concept that changes overtime. A start-up 
organization cares more about its survival, thus its concept of sustainable growth is 
rather narrowed to the short-term: the financial performance and the development 
of functional areas strictly connected with the production of product/services. A 
consolidated organization should be more concerned about the long-term 
Figure 59: The perspectives for assessing sustainable growth. Source: Bianchi 2012 (re-adaptation) 
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performances, towards a harmonious development of the organization as a whole, a 
solid competitive advantage and a constant attention to its social commitment.  
 
4.2 Quantitative results from the implementation of a holistic development 
strategy 
 
This section of the chapter is devoted to the quantitative results deriving from 
the application of the “holistic development” theory to the design of a territory’s 
performance management system in order to improve the competitiveness of Italy 
as well as the economic and financial performance of both enterprises and Italian 
State. The holistic development is not a fine theory permeated with values difficult 
to implement in public policy, but it acts in a way much more effective than it 
could be considered. 
For this purpose, once again the model is invoked in order to give objectivity 
and certainty to the figures in the game within an accurate public policies’ design. 
The following table (Table 6) shows the parameters of some policies that the 
Italian State could be ready to implement in order to improve the Country’s legal 
and organizational framework. As mentioned above, policies designed according to 
a holistic development approach create a virtuous circle where good performances 
of State and other institutions of society are strictly connected and even influence 
each other. The policies recommended, thus, consist in:  
a)  increasing competition in the capital markets and utilities;  
b) increasing efficiency of payments due by public organizations, as well as 
ensuring brief times and transparency in obtaining authorizations from public 
authorities;  
c) guaranteeing short times for the settlement of commercial disputes, and 
simplification of enterprises’ tax and administrative compliance. 
d) improving the functioning and the endowment of infrastructures to benefit 
enterprises productivity. 
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The model simulation specifically excludes a change in the current tax leverage 
in order not to sacrifice in the short term the amount of tax income which the State 
needs for its institutional purposes (although a reduction of too high general 
administrative expenses may allow lower tax rates). 
Table 6 lists the policy adopted and their parameters according to the scheme 
provided in Table 5. This last concerned the legal and organizational framework’s 
parameters used to simulate not only the activity and localization strategy of Italian 
enterprises but also financial performance of the Italian State. The new one (Table 
6) integrates Table 5 with two additional columns indicating those policies adopted 
and consequently the new parameters concerning the legal and organizational 
framework. These last have been set to the average level of Italy’s neighboring 
European countries (Austria and Germany). 
Table 6: Specification of policies adopted and their parameters 
Variables' list Units ITALY EU (A/D) Policy switch Policy's param.
Interest rates on long term loans % 6,24 3,49 Yes 3,49
Interest rate on deposit advances % 4,86 2,56 Yes 2,56
Time to obtain authorization days 730 80 Yes 80
Av. time to cash from public organiz. days 193-269* 45 Yes 45
Infrastructure quality and availability 0-1 0,9 1 Yes 1
Tolls per km eur 0,136 0 No
Fuel cost (per liter) eur 1,76 1,50 No
Cost of power per MWh eur 192 125 Yes 125
Salary per work unit (per month) eur 1800 2100 No
Monthly social security per work unit eur 705 462 No
Av. time to settle commercial disputes days 1210 273 Yes 273
Time of tax and burocracy compliance days 119 70 Yes 70
Tax on profits % 32** 25 No
Real state tax  % EV 0,01 0,005*** No
** It includes IRAP rate
*** Extimation
* In Public healthcare
 
In the following figures (60 to 63) are thus illustrated policy’s results according 
to the “holistic development” approach now implemented in the Italian State. 
According to the analysis framework illustrated in Figure 58, it has been verified 
that results of the policies adopted produce positive effects to all of the type of 
institutions concerned by public policies: State, enterprises, and families. To this 
end, among tens of model’s variable, it has been decided to illustrate the most 
representative ones to describe the welfare of all institutions above: “profits stock” 
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and “delocalization” for enterprises, “unemployment” for families, and “tax 
income” for State. Results are showed over a ten-yearly horizon.  
Figure 60 shows Italian enterprises’ cumulated profits. In the holistic 
development scenario (red curve) each enterprise records more profits. Profits 
stock at the end of the period analyzed is 28% higher than in absence of this. 
Figure 61 illustrates the dynamics of Italian delocalized enterprises and extra-
European FDI’s inflow in Italy. In absence of a holistic development strategy (blue 
curve), both phenomena occur since national manufacturers delocalize and FDI 
prefer other European countries. In the other scenario (red curve), national 
manufactures are initially retained in Italy until profit’s difference vis-à-vis other 
countries is not significant. 
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Figure 60 
 
During the first six years of the analyzed period (10 years), the model records 
only the loss of FDI’s inflow from extra-European countries caused by higher costs 
in Italy: although the simulated administrative and legal framework efficiency is 
the same of other European countries (equal production costs), Italy still has higher 
taxes. At the end of year 10 the simulation reports 5,222 enterprises retained from 
delocalization. 
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Figure 61 
In figure 62 is illustrated the dynamic of unemployment connected to 
delocalization and loss of FDI’s inflow from extra-European countries. In the 
holistic development strategy (red curve), the unemployment originated by both 
phenomena is 37.1% lower than in absence of such strategy. 
20:48    mar 15 ott 2013
Unemploy ment f rom Delocalization - 10 y ears' horizon
Page 1
1,00 130,75 260,50 390,25 520,00
Weeks
1:
1:
1:
0
250000
500000
people unemploy ed: 1 - 2 - 
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
 
Figure 62 
Figure 63 shows policy’s results in term of tax income for Italian State. In the 
holistic development scenario (red curve) the Italian State, records an additional 
21.3% cumulated tax income (net of unemployment benefits) compared to the 
absence of such strategy, i.e. 274.1 billion euro, at constant fiscal leverage.  
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Figure 63 
Such result for the Italian State arises by an higher retention of enterprises and 
less expenditures for unemployment benefits as well as by taxation of larger profits 
of enterprises producing in Italy. 
Model’s results following the implementation of the holistic development 
strategy prove the validity of such approach and its essentiality in public 
strategizing. As described above, this approach excludes in public strategizing any 
maximization of one success’ dimension of State organization (financial results), 
preferring an appreciable achievement degree of all of them (financial, internal, 
external and social results). 
In a holistic development strategy the State focuses on strategic assets for the 
country’s economic development. The underlying strategic horizon is evidently the 
long term since is related to assets and not to financial resources (e.g. tax income). 
Policy makers implement policies in order to activate, through investments in 
strategic assets, the performance drivers responsible for the development of 
strategic assets stocks. Improvement and enrichment of society are given by “cash 
flows” (end results) arising from such investments in strategic assets. Financial 
results are either expended to consolidate State’s financial accounts or invested 
once again, by reiteration of the process, in strategic resources, thus producing even 
more appreciable end results. 
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4.3 The effects of “holistic development” strategies on Social capital growth to 
the benefit of Italy’s global competitiveness 
 
The concept of “holistic development” has a paramount importance in 
understanding the relevance of interactions between strategies and activities of 
institutions in an economic system. The quantity and quality of such interactions, 
combined with the values and the trust existing in the society, may provide a 
plausible quantification of the so-called social capital.  
The term capital “it is usually identified with tangible, durable and alienable 
objects, such as buildings and machines, whose accumulation can be estimated and 
whose worth can be assessed” (Solow 2000). 
At an international institutional level, social capital is defined as "networks, 
together with rules, shared views and values facilitating cooperation within and 
between groups” (OECD). In a similar manner the World Bank defines it as “the 
institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a 
society's social interactions." 
In literature, among the most influential contributions, three main 
contemporary authors need to be absolutely mentioned: Bourdieu, Coleman, and 
Putnam.  
Bourdieu is responsible for bringing the concept and term social capital to 
present-day discussions (Claridge, 2004). Although his level of analysis is rather 
focused on individuals, the author is the first to introduce the social capital’s 
feature of “network belonging”. He defines Social Capital as “the aggregate of the 
actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of 
more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition 
or in other words, to membership in a group which provides each of its members 
with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a credential which entitles them 
to credit, in the various senses of the word” (Bourdieu 1986). 
Only few years later, the analysis’ level of social capital started to be extended 
not only to a single entity, but also to a variety of different institutions having in 
 96 
 
common the feature of “social structure” in which the actions of their components 
are in some way facilitated (Coleman 1988). Main Coleman’s contribution in the 
field of Social capital research could be synthesized as follow: 
a) Coleman, compared to Bourdieu, extended the analysis’ level from 
individuals to other entities, including non-elite groups (Schuller et al. 
2000); 
b) He also started to analyze empirically relationships among such entities and 
to formulate assessment’s indicators (Schuller et al. 2000); 
c) He also investigated on the productive nature of capital (as a society’s 
strategic asset) and its influences on other type of capital such as human and 
cultural capital (Teachman et al. 1997). 
It was Robert Putnam to widen further the analysis’ level of Social capital 
studies and popularize the concept of social capital through the study of civic 
engagement in Italy (Boggs 2001). The author in “In Making Democracy Work” 
(Putnam et al. 1993) extended further the analysis to a wider level represented by 
communities and Regions and analyzed the differences, in terms of social capital 
presence, among Regions in the north and south of Italy. The civic engagement was 
chosen by the author as social capital’s measure. Such indicator is recalled in 
subsequent Putnam’s works focused on the decline in civic engagement in the 
United States. In “Bowling Alone”16 Putnam identified a general secular decline in 
levels of social capital as indicated by membership in voluntary organizations 
(Putnam 1995, Putnam 2000). 
Putnam gave the following definition of Social Capital: “it refers to features of 
social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam et al. 1993). 
Like Coleman, Putnam was extensively involved in empirical research and 
formulation of indicators. Specifically, he elaborated one of the most widely 
applied Social capital’s measures: the index of civic engagement. Such index 
                                                 
16
 Bowling, to which the title refers, is an activity used to be highly associational and it is portrayed 
by the author as example of source of social interaction, a component of social capital, as 
enlightened in Putnam’s definition of Social Capital. 
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includes, according to Putnam’s Social capital definition, four indicators: trust in 
people and institutions, norms of reciprocity, networks and membership in 
voluntary associations (Adam and Roncevic 2003).  
The contributions of the literature therefore distinguish two fundamental 
elements that foster the social capital development: the network and the trust. It 
follows that wider is the network and more solid the trust, the more will be the 
benefit in terms of an increase of social capital for the society as a whole.  
Figure 64 shows a first reading scheme to assess the social capital’s 
development following the implementation of the “holistic development” approach 
in public policies. To this end Pezzani (2011) distinguishes four types of 
institutions operating in society: public organizations, enterprises, families and 
non-profit institutions. These institutions are connected among them by economic, 
financial and social relationships. The strength of the relationships between public 
organization, families and enterprises depends on reciprocal trust.  
State’s policies design that do not consider the risk of harming other society’s 
institutions, as well as an inefficient organizational and legal framework, 
undoubtedly reduce (as showed in Figure 64) the reciprocal trust among institutions 
(bidirectional curves). Such kind of policies not only foster in enterprises a feeling 
of disappointment towards public institutions, but also in turn produce an even 
lower social commitment of enterprises and their steadfastness on which the State 
can rely. Eventually, an impoverishment of networks and trust, sources of Social 
capital, determines the depletion of such strategic asset for the development of the 
Italian State. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 64: Representation of the network and trust among society’s institutions 
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Social capital contributes to improve the competitiveness and development of a 
territory more effectively than one might think. Lyon (2005) has represented the 
concept by using a simple extension of the standard production function: 
Yit = F(Kit, Lit, Si, Ait) 
where Y,K,L,S, and A are, respectively, value added, capital, labor, social 
capital, and a productivity measure. All variables except S are subscripted by both i 
and t to indicate that they vary with region i and time t; social capital alone is 
assumed not to change over time and varies only by region (Lyon 2005). In the 
study of Lyon social capital thus becomes an essential production’s factor.  
How can networks, trust, and reciprocity norms contribute to productivity? As 
showed by Figure 65, this happens by reducing transaction costs between parties 
(belonging to the same or different kind of institutions) who do not know each 
other. Furthermore, norms of reciprocity help to contain the free riding behavior 
(Lyon 2005) of some institutions to the detriment of others.  
In synthesis, replying the same scheme of analysis traced for the development 
of strategic resources (see Figures 11 and 58), with some adjustments, one can 
undoubtedly state that social capital represents a strategic asset for the development 
of a territory and an indispensable factor of global competitiveness.  
 
Figure 65: Social capital contribution in terms of productivity and competitiveness 
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As illustrated by Figure 65, this strategic asset is increased through 
improvements in networks and trust (end results) whose drivers are given by: a) 
network investments; b) collaboration between institutions; c) shared norms & 
beliefs; d) mutual obligations; e) perceived fairness of policies; f) reciprocity; g) 
transparency. 
In conclusion, since a holistic development strategy reconciles all sizes of 
business success and creates benefits for all institutions involved in the territory, it 
consequently promotes collaboration, shared norms and beliefs, mutual obligations, 
perceived fairness, reciprocity, transparency and network among institutions of 
society, all drivers responsible for the development of social capital. It benefits 
society as a whole in terms of lower transaction costs, fewer opportunistic behavior 
and speed of information. Ultimately, these factors affect directly production costs 
and consequently the competitiveness of private and public organizations. 
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CONCLUSIONS & IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
The logical and analytic framework of the present study has been set according 
to the main purposes (or expected effects) of evaluation process: the “policy 
learning” and the accountability (Dente 2006) described in Chapter 2. The first 
objective is certainly represented by a conscious vision of the reality, the so called 
“enlightenment” (Weiss 1998). In the first chapter the “enlightenment” has been 
pulled out through a maieutic approach bringing attention to the problem of poor 
global competitiveness of Italy with the support of statistical evidences. Such 
analysis have been combined in order to prove the unsustainability, both for the 
State and for the companies, of an approach in public strategizing that, while 
maximizing the short-term interest of State’s finances, at the same time destroys 
the strategic assets, which are the bases on which the State obtains the finances to 
carry on its institutional activities. If on the one hand the tools to understand the 
reality currently exist, on the other hand the analysis are often not combined for 
specific purposes. Thus the “enlightenment” is prevented by a lack of political 
willingness as well as the intellectual honesty to use such analysis to recognize the 
real results of the public policies implemented. 
In the second chapter, the analysis has also identified the five major critical 
areas of Italian State’s programming cycle and provided a real case (whose policy 
makers seem unaware) of failure of policies adopted regardless such criticalities. 
Although the State’s programming cycle has been improved considerably along the 
last triennium, it is still affected by the following critical areas:  
a) The lack of evaluation of the policy adopted for the program 
accomplishment; 
b) The lack of evaluation of the complex of policies in force on specific 
sectors; 
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c) Policy’s spatial horizon still focused within national boundaries; 
d) Vision oriented to inputs and not to the development of State’s strategic 
assets; 
e) Ways by which budget allocation’s decisions are taken, although such 
issue is common to the majority of democracies. 
In order to fill the gaps concerning both the methodology and the informative 
basis necessary to design public policies, the System dynamics models have been  
introduced to supplement the current models of performance management. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, the use of simulation models, and in particular those of 
system dynamics, may improve considerably the effectiveness of public policies by 
testing ex ante their results and their implementation in order to reduce the risk to 
fail and to harm the society. Furthermore, the State’s programming cycle could 
benefit from an ex ante specification of objectives, hypotheses, relationships, 
means, scrutiny of results and policy’s implementation issues: all the elements that 
a simulation model always requires. When well implemented, simulation models 
allow to create objective and transparent informative bases and consequently to set 
up the decisional processes.  
The use of System dynamics models (compared to other simulation models), 
enables also a solution of complex and dynamic problems (i.e. problems arising 
from interactions of tens of variables and circular causal relationships among them) 
since System dynamics models take into account at the same time interactions of 
all variables and their causal relationships. Such models also reduce drastically the 
time and resources employed to plan, control and design a sustainable policy. 
Simulations, tests, and results of policies obtained ex ante enable not only a fast 
definition/redefinition of the strategies to pursue, but also a quick decisional 
process based on objective and trustful information. 
In the case study provided in Chapter 3, the System dynamics model has 
simulated the long term performance of an enterprise operating in Italy, its 
localization strategy, as well as the financial performance of Italian State obtained 
on national enterprises stock. It enlightens how the current austerity measures, 
focused exclusively on consolidating public finances on the short term and not on 
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developing Country’s strategic assets, will undermine already in the medium-term 
the economic development as well as the sources of receipts for the Italian State. 
Model’s quantitative results (referred to a stock of 223,494 Italian enterprises 
and assuming an average workforce of 30 units per enterprise and fiscal leverage’s 
stability) show, in a time horizon of 10 years, a financial damage for the Italian 
State of about 462 billion of Euro, 29.5% of national GDP, 23.2% of public debt in 
2012 (Istat 2013). 
The model, by dynamically including enterprises’ activity in the public 
strategizing, demonstrates that the wealth of private institutions cannot anymore be 
considered as independent variable in public strategizing. Consequently, the 
success of public policies passes undoubtedly by the valorization of collaboration 
with private firms for “co-creating” their global competitive advantage and that of 
the country in which they operate. To this end the present study has theorized, and 
tested through a System dynamics model, the effectiveness of a new paradigm for 
the Italian State’s programming cycle. Such model is featured by the following 
elements: 
1) The State focuses on strategic resources’ assets for the Country’s 
economic development and additional financial resource for State. The 
underlying strategic horizon is evidently long term oriented since it is 
related to assets and not to revenues (e.g. tax income); 
2) Policy makers implement policies in order to achieve the development 
of such strategic assets (performance drivers); 
3) Improvement and enrichment of the society are given by the “cash 
flows” (end results) arising from investments in strategic assets. 
Financial results are expended to consolidate State’s financial accounts 
and invested once again (by reiteration of the process) in strategic 
resources, thus producing even more appreciable end results. 
The new State’s programming paradigm not only enhances the role of the State 
in the territory’s development, but also strengthens its relationships with the 
territory. State is not anymore an entity that operates separated from the reality in 
which is involved, but becomes the sole institution that may elaborate a “holistic 
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development” strategy for its territory as a whole, and weight different 
stakeholders’ interests for the appreciable development of all of them. 
The holistic development of the State occurs when strategies and objectives are 
respectively set and reached along the following four dimensions:  
a) the achievement of a good economic and financial result; 
b) the internal dimension that such result have in terms of growth in 
values, knowledge, economic growth,  professionalism, work efficiency 
and cohesion; 
c) the external reflection over the recipients (i.e. enterprises and families), 
for which the State organization must be resource-generating value; 
d) the positive reflection over the socio-economic and environmental 
context in which public strategies take place. Such results’ dimension is 
mainly responsible for the social capital development in the society. 
Good management, services, and transparency foster in individuals 
their social commitments, honesty and a solid trust towards public 
institutions.  
The “holistic development” approach excludes any maximization of one 
success’ dimension of organizations (such as of profits, tax income or surplus in 
national accounts) preferring an appreciable degree of achievement of all of them.  
Thus the “holistic development” approach does not concern solely the State’s 
development, but its benefits influence positively the whole society since its action 
is addressed to create the success’ drivers of other society’s institutions. This 
creates a virtuous circle where State organization creates the “necessary 
conditions” for the development of all the institutions involved in building the 
global competitiveness of a country: a) public organizations; b) enterprises; c) 
families. At once, those institutions will provide the State organization with the 
drivers needed for achieving its objectives through its institutional activities. Such 
drivers are composed by: a) additional financial resources; b) higher educated 
human resources in the public organizations’ management.  
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The holistic development is not a fine theory permeated with values difficult to 
implement in public policy, but acts in a way much more effective than it could be 
considered. In the system dynamics model simulating performance of both 
enterprises and State, the holistic development approach is worth (at constant fiscal 
leverage and over a period of 10 years): a) +28% enterprises’ profits; b) 5,222 
enterprises retained from delocalization; c) -37% of unemployment caused by 
delocalization; d) +274.1 billion of Euro of State’s tax income (17.5% of Italian 
GDP in 2012, Istat 2013). 
A holistic development’s approach in public strategizing, since it reconciles all 
the dimensions of business success and creates benefits for all institutions involved 
in the territory, fosters considerably the development of the social capital. The 
holistic development activates the drivers responsible for the development of such 
society’s strategic asset, thereby leading to a reinforcement of the network and 
trust’s links between the institutions. Both factors benefit the society as a whole in 
terms of lower transaction costs, fewer opportunistic behavior and speed of 
information. So the social capital should be considered as a production factor as 
well as capital, labor, and productivity (Lyon 2005). Its greater or lesser presence 
affects production costs and it can significantly determine the competitiveness of 
private and public organizations, as well as the one of the Italian State at an 
international level.  
Ultimately, the limitations of my study are addressed as implicit 
recommendations for future research.  
First and foremost, the study is limited to those market situation featured by 
absence of duties as well as restrictions on the movement of people and goods. In 
relation to the European common market, the study highlights a competition 
between States in providing the best operating conditions to businesses as well as 
lower taxes. If on one hand this facilitates competition between the States, on the 
other one this does not allow the setting of a common policy among the member 
States and may result into a “fratricidal economic war” that surely was not the 
intention of the European Union’s founders.  
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Further researches may extend the model boundaries by including those market 
situations featured by the presence of constraints and duties. Therefore, such a 
model may be useful to support the States in designing long-term competitive 
strategies and in strategic decisions as the settlement of duties, incentives to 
national firms, etc. 
Secondly, the study provides an analysis framework for evaluating the effects 
of “holistic development” policies on social capital growth. Subsequent researches 
may relate to the expansion of the System dynamics model provided in order to 
simulate the variation in social capital stock resulting from public policies 
implementation. The quantification of social capital variation has always been a 
considerable problem for scholars since it is essentially composed by qualitative 
variables. This problem could be overcome by anchoring the variation of the social 
capital in the society to some quantitative variables of the model, such as the firms’ 
relocation rate, unemployment originated from such relocation, cuts of welfare 
caused by lower tax income, as well as other variables to add to the specific 
purpose. 
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APPENDIX A – List of model’s 
equations 
 
1. Accounts_payable(t) = Accounts_payable(t - 
dt) + (incr - decr) * dt 
2. INIT Accounts_payable = 0 
3. INFLOWS: 
4. incr = 
Operating__expenses+product__direct_cost 
5. OUTFLOWS: 
6. decr = DELAY(incr,TTP) 
7. Accounts_payable_2(t) = 
Accounts_payable_2(t - dt) + (incr_2 - 
decr_2) * dt 
8. INIT Accounts_payable_2 = 0 
9. INFLOWS: 
10. incr_2 = 
Operating__expenses_2+product__direct_cos
t_2 
11. OUTFLOWS: 
12. decr_2 = DELAY(incr_2,TTP_2) 
13. Accounts__receivable(t) = 
Accounts__receivable(t - dt) + 
(Revenues_to_cash - cashed_on_time - 
settling - anticipation) * dt 
14. INIT Accounts__receivable = 0 
15. INFLOWS: 
16. Revenues_to_cash = 
invoiced_sales*to_cash_fract 
17. OUTFLOWS: 
18. cashed_on_time = 
Accounts__receivable*Fraction_cashed_on_t
ime/Normal_delay 
19. settling = 
Accounts__receivable*fract_disputes/waiting
_time 
20. anticipation = 
Accounts__receivable*Fraction_ant/admin_d
elay 
21. Accounts__receivable_2(t) = 
Accounts__receivable_2(t - dt) + 
(Revenues_to_cash_2 - cashed_on_time_2 - 
settling_2 - anticipation_2) * dt 
22. INIT Accounts__receivable_2 = 0 
23. INFLOWS: 
24. Revenues_to_cash_2 = 
invoiced_sales_2*to_cash_fract_2 
25. OUTFLOWS: 
26. cashed_on_time_2 = 
Accounts__receivable_2*Fraction_cashed_o
n_time_2/Normal_delay_2 
27. settling_2 = 
Accounts__receivable_2*fraction_disputes_2
/waiting_time_2 
28. anticipation_2 = 
Accounts__receivable_2*Fraction_ant_2/ad
min_delay_2 
29. accum_for_equip(t) = accum_for_equip(t - 
dt) + (for_Equip - replacement) * dt 
30. INIT accum_for_equip = 0 
31. INFLOWS: 
32. for_Equip = gap 
33. OUTFLOWS: 
34. replacement = accum_for_equip/TTR 
35. Accum_loss(t) = Accum_loss(t - dt) + 
(yearly_loss) * dt 
36. INIT Accum_loss = 0 
37. INFLOWS: 
38. yearly_loss = 
Enterprises'_moved_to_UE*tax_payment+de
localization*av_WFU_per_enterprise*equal_
grants 
39. acc_for_equip_2(t) = acc_for_equip_2(t - dt) 
+ (for_Equip_2 - replacement_2) * dt 
40. INIT acc_for_equip_2 = 0 
41. INFLOWS: 
42. for_Equip_2 = gap_2 
43. OUTFLOWS: 
44. replacement_2 = acc_for_equip_2/TTR_2 
45. acc_for_P&P(t) = acc_for_P&P(t - dt) + 
(for_P&P - P&P_invest) * dt 
46. INIT acc_for_P&P = 0 
47. INFLOWS: 
48. for_P&P = (Amount_to_invest-
for_Equip)*equip_inv_fraction 
49. OUTFLOWS: 
50. P&P_invest = IF (acc_for_P&P>50000) 
THEN 
(acc_for_P&P/(authorization_time+building_
time)) ELSE 0 
51. acc_for_P&P_2(t) = acc_for_P&P_2(t - dt) + 
(for_P&P_2 - P&P_invest_2) * dt 
52. INIT acc_for_P&P_2 = 0 
53. INFLOWS: 
54. for_P&P_2 = (Amount_to_invest_2-
for_Equip_2)*equip_inv_fraction_2 
55. OUTFLOWS: 
56. P&P_invest_2 = IF (acc_for_P&P_2>50000) 
THEN 
(acc_for_P&P_2/(authorization_time_2+buil
ding_time_2)) ELSE 0 
57. acc_for_R&D(t) = acc_for_R&D(t - dt) + 
(for_R&D - inv_R&D) * dt 
58. INIT acc_for_R&D = 150000 
59. INFLOWS: 
60. for_R&D = (Amount_to_invest-
for_Equip)*invR&D_fract 
61. OUTFLOWS: 
62. inv_R&D = acc_for_R&D/research_time 
63. acc_for_R&D_2(t) = acc_for_R&D_2(t - dt) 
+ (for_R&D_2 - inv_R&D_2) * dt 
64. INIT acc_for_R&D_2 = 150000 
65. INFLOWS: 
66. for_R&D_2 = (Amount_to_invest_2-
for_Equip_2)*invR&Dfract_2 
67. OUTFLOWS: 
68. inv_R&D_2 = 
acc_for_R&D_2/research_time_2 
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69. Amount_to_invest(t) = Amount_to_invest(t - 
dt) + (investments - for_R&D - for_P&P - 
for_Equip) * dt 
70. INIT Amount_to_invest = 0 
71. INFLOWS: 
72. investments = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time=0) THEN 
(Earnings*inv_fraction) ELSE 0,16) 
73. OUTFLOWS: 
74. for_R&D = (Amount_to_invest-
for_Equip)*invR&D_fract 
75. for_P&P = (Amount_to_invest-
for_Equip)*equip_inv_fraction 
76. for_Equip = gap 
77. Amount_to_invest_2(t) = 
Amount_to_invest_2(t - dt) + (investments_2 
- for_R&D_2 - for_P&P_2 - for_Equip_2) * 
dt 
78. INIT Amount_to_invest_2 = 0 
79. INFLOWS: 
80. investments_2 = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time_2=0) THEN 
(Earnings_2*inv_fraction_2) ELSE 0,16) 
81. OUTFLOWS: 
82. for_R&D_2 = (Amount_to_invest_2-
for_Equip_2)*invR&Dfract_2 
83. for_P&P_2 = (Amount_to_invest_2-
for_Equip_2)*equip_inv_fraction_2 
84. for_Equip_2 = gap_2 
85. Bank_loans(t) = Bank_loans(t - dt) + 
(new_bank_loans - redemption) * dt 
86. INIT Bank_loans = 5000000 
87. INFLOWS: 
88. new_bank_loans = 
DELaY(MAX(Desired_cash-
Cash,0),adj_time,adj_time) 
89. OUTFLOWS: 
90. redemption = Bank_loans/redemption_time 
91. Bank_loans_2(t) = Bank_loans_2(t - dt) + 
(new_bank_loans_2 - redemption_2) * dt 
92. INIT Bank_loans_2 = 5000000 
93. INFLOWS: 
94. new_bank_loans_2 = 
DELaY(MAX(Desired_cash_2-
Cash_2,0),adj_time_2,adj_time_2) 
95. OUTFLOWS: 
96. redemption_2 = 
Bank_loans_2/redemption_time_2 
97. Cash(t) = Cash(t - dt) + (settled + 
immediate_cash + cash_anticip + cash_invest 
+ cashed_on_time - cash_payments) * dt 
98. INIT Cash = 200000 
99. INFLOWS: 
100. settled = disputes/av_time 
101. immediate_cash = 
invoiced_sales*immediate_cash_fract 
102. cash_anticip = anticipation+new_bank_loans 
103. cash_invest = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time=0) THEN 
(Earnings*cash_fract) ELSE 0,16) 
104. cashed_on_time = 
Accounts__receivable*Fraction_cashed_on_t
ime/Normal_delay 
105. OUTFLOWS: 
106. cash_payments = 
decr+tax_payment+redempted+redemption+I
nterest__expenses+Personnel_cost 
107. Cash_2(t) = Cash_2(t - dt) + (settled_2 + 
immediate_cash_2 + cash_anticip_2 + 
cash_invest_2 + cashed_on_time_2 - 
cash_payments_2) * dt 
108. INIT Cash_2 = 200000 
109. INFLOWS: 
110. settled_2 = disputes_2/av_time_2 
111. immediate_cash_2 = 
invoiced_sales_2*immediate_cash_fract_2 
112. cash_anticip_2 = 
anticipation_2+new_bank_loans_2 
113. cash_invest_2 = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time_2=0) THEN 
(Earnings_2*cash_fract_2) ELSE 0,16) 
114. cashed_on_time_2 = 
Accounts__receivable_2*Fraction_cashed_o
n_time_2/Normal_delay_2 
115. OUTFLOWS: 
116. cash_payments_2 = 
decr_2+tax_payment_2+redempted_2+redem
ption_2+Interest__expenses_2+Personnel_co
st_2 
117. disputes(t) = disputes(t - dt) + (settling - 
settled) * dt 
118. INIT disputes = 0 
119. INFLOWS: 
120. settling = 
Accounts__receivable*fract_disputes/waiting
_time 
121. OUTFLOWS: 
122. settled = disputes/av_time 
123. disputes_2(t) = disputes_2(t - dt) + 
(settling_2 - settled_2) * dt 
124. INIT disputes_2 = 0 
125. INFLOWS: 
126. settling_2 = 
Accounts__receivable_2*fraction_disputes_2
/waiting_time_2 
127. OUTFLOWS: 
128. settled_2 = disputes_2/av_time_2 
129. Earnings(t) = Earnings(t - dt) + (Net_Profit - 
investments - dividends - cash_invest) * dt 
130. INIT Earnings = 0 
131. INFLOWS: 
132. Net_Profit = (invoiced_sales-
Interest__expenses-Taxation-
Operating__expenses-Personnel_cost-
product__direct_cost) 
133. OUTFLOWS: 
134. investments = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time=0) THEN 
(Earnings*inv_fraction) ELSE 0,16) 
135. dividends = DELAY(IF(decisional__time=0) 
THEN (Earnings*remun_fraction) ELSE 
0,16) 
136. cash_invest = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time=0) THEN 
(Earnings*cash_fract) ELSE 0,16) 
137. Earnings_2(t) = Earnings_2(t - dt) + 
(Net_Profit_2 - investments_2 - dividends_2 
- cash_invest_2) * dt 
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138. INIT Earnings_2 = 0 
139. INFLOWS: 
140. Net_Profit_2 = (invoiced_sales_2-
Interest__expenses_2-Taxation_2-
Operating__expenses_2-Personnel_cost_2-
product__direct_cost_2) 
141. OUTFLOWS: 
142. investments_2 = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time_2=0) THEN 
(Earnings_2*inv_fraction_2) ELSE 0,16) 
143. dividends_2 = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time_2=0) THEN 
(Earnings_2*remun_fraction_2) ELSE 0,16) 
144. cash_invest_2 = 
DELAY(IF(decisional__time_2=0) THEN 
(Earnings_2*cash_fract_2) ELSE 0,16) 
145. Enterprises'_moved_to_UE(t) = 
Enterprises'_moved_to_UE(t - dt) + 
(delocalization + FDI__2) * dt 
146. INIT Enterprises'_moved_to_UE = 0 
147. INFLOWS: 
148. delocalization = IF (PS1_PS2<0.86) THEN 
(enterprises'_stock_Italy*losing_rate) ELSE 
0 
149. FDI__2 = IF (PS1_PS2<1) THEN 
(enterprises'_stock_Italy*attraction__rate_2) 
ELSE 0 
150. enterprises'_stock_Italy(t) = 
enterprises'_stock_Italy(t - dt) + (FDI - 
delocalization) * dt 
151. INIT enterprises'_stock_Italy = 223494 
152. INFLOWS: 
153. FDI = IF (PS1_PS2>1) THEN 
(enterprises'_stock_Italy*attract_rate) ELSE 
0 
154. OUTFLOWS: 
155. delocalization = IF (PS1_PS2<0.86) THEN 
(enterprises'_stock_Italy*losing_rate) ELSE 
0 
156. equipments(t) = equipments(t - dt) + 
(replacement - depreciation) * dt 
157. INIT equipments = 3000000 
158. INFLOWS: 
159. replacement = accum_for_equip/TTR 
160. OUTFLOWS: 
161. depreciation = equipments*fract_decay 
162. equipment_2(t) = equipment_2(t - dt) + 
(replacement_2 - depreciation_2) * dt 
163. INIT equipment_2 = 3000000 
164. INFLOWS: 
165. replacement_2 = acc_for_equip_2/TTR_2 
166. OUTFLOWS: 
167. depreciation_2 = equipment_2*fract_decay_2 
168. financed_by_bank_2(t) = 
financed_by_bank_2(t - dt) + (anticipation_2 
- redempted_2) * dt 
169. INIT financed_by_bank_2 = 0 
170. INFLOWS: 
171. anticipation_2 = 
Accounts__receivable_2*Fraction_ant_2/ad
min_delay_2 
172. OUTFLOWS: 
173. redempted_2 = 
DELAY(financed_by_bank_2,redempt_time
_2) 
174. financed__by_bank(t) = financed__by_bank(t 
- dt) + (anticipation - redempted) * dt 
175. INIT financed__by_bank = 0 
176. INFLOWS: 
177. anticipation = 
Accounts__receivable*Fraction_ant/admin_d
elay 
178. OUTFLOWS: 
179. redempted = 
DELAY(financed__by_bank,redempt_time) 
180. Foreign_country_FP_income(t) = 
Foreign_country_FP_income(t - dt) + 
(Net_FP_tax_i_ncome_2) * dt 
181. INIT Foreign_country_FP_income = 0 
182. INFLOWS: 
183. Net_FP_tax_i_ncome_2 = 
tax_payment_2*Stock_SE+yearly_loss 
184. Intangible_assets(t) = Intangible_assets(t - dt) 
+ (inv_R&D - Obsolescence) * dt 
185. INIT Intangible_assets = 500000 
186. INFLOWS: 
187. inv_R&D = acc_for_R&D/research_time 
188. OUTFLOWS: 
189. Obsolescence = Intangible_assets/Obs_time 
190. Intangible_assets_2(t) = Intangible_assets_2(t 
- dt) + (inv_R&D_2 - Obsolescence_2) * dt 
191. INIT Intangible_assets_2 = 500000 
192. INFLOWS: 
193. inv_R&D_2 = 
acc_for_R&D_2/research_time_2 
194. OUTFLOWS: 
195. Obsolescence_2 = 
Intangible_assets_2/Obs_time_2 
196. inventory(t) = inventory(t - dt) + 
(production_rate - shipment__rate) * dt 
197. INIT inventory = 100000 
198. INFLOWS: 
199. production_rate = 
DELAY((desired_product_inv-
inventory),prod_time_2,prod_time_2) 
200. OUTFLOWS: 
201. shipment__rate = 
DELAY(mkt_demand,delay_in_perceiving_
&shipment,delay_in_perceiving_&shipment) 
202. inventory_2(t) = inventory_2(t - dt) + 
(production_rate_2 - shipment__rate_2) * dt 
203. INIT inventory_2 = 100000 
204. INFLOWS: 
205. production_rate_2 = 
DELAY((desired_product_inv_2-
inventory_2),prod_time_3,prod_time_3) 
206. OUTFLOWS: 
207. shipment__rate_2 = 
DELAY(mkt_demand_2,delay_in_perceiving
_&shipment_2,delay_in_perceiving_&shipm
ent_2) 
208. Italy_FP_income(t) = Italy_FP_income(t - dt) 
+ (Net_FP_tax_income_1) * dt 
209. INIT Italy_FP_income = 0 
210. INFLOWS: 
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211. Net_FP_tax_income_1 = 
tax_payment*Stock_SE-yearly_loss 
212. Pre_tax_earnings_2(t) = 
Pre_tax_earnings_2(t - dt) + 
(invoiced_sales_2 - Interest__expenses_2 - 
Taxation_2 - product__direct_cost_2 - 
Operating__expenses_2 - Personnel_cost_2 - 
Net_Profit_2) * dt 
213. INIT Pre_tax_earnings_2 = 0 
214. INFLOWS: 
215. invoiced_sales_2 = 
shipment__rate_2*MIN(price_per_unit_2,7.5
) 
216. OUTFLOWS: 
217. Interest__expenses_2 = 
Bank_loans_2*LT_debt_cost_2+financed_by
_bank_2*ST_debt_cost_2 
218. Taxation_2 = (invoiced_sales_2-
Interest__expenses_2-
Operating__expenses_2-Personnel_cost_2-
product__direct_cost_2)*IRES_rate_2+prope
rty_&__plants_2*IMU_2/52 
219. product__direct_cost_2 = 
RM__usage_rate_2*RM_unit_cost_2+ship_i
n_cost_2+ship_out_cost_2 
220. Operating__expenses_2 = 
admin_expenses_2+electricity_2+tax_&_bur
eacracy_compliance_2 
221. Personnel_cost_2 = 
work_force_2*(WFU_cost_2+WFU_SS_2) 
222. Net_Profit_2 = (invoiced_sales_2-
Interest__expenses_2-Taxation_2-
Operating__expenses_2-Personnel_cost_2-
product__direct_cost_2) 
223. Pre_tax__earnings(t) = Pre_tax__earnings(t - 
dt) + (invoiced_sales - Interest__expenses - 
Taxation - product__direct_cost - 
Operating__expenses - Personnel_cost - 
Net_Profit) * dt 
224. INIT Pre_tax__earnings = 0 
225. INFLOWS: 
226. invoiced_sales = 
shipment__rate*MIN(price_per_unit,7.5) 
227. OUTFLOWS: 
228. Interest__expenses = 
Bank_loans*LT_debt_cost+financed__by_ba
nk*ST_debt_cost 
229. Taxation = (invoiced_sales-
Interest__expenses-Operating__expenses-
Personnel_cost-
product__direct_cost)*IRES_rate+(invoiced_
sales-Operating__expenses-
product__direct_cost-
0.50*Interest__expenses)*IRAP_rate+(prope
rty__&_plants*IMU/52) 
230. product__direct_cost = 
RM__usage_rate*RM_unit_cost+ship_in_co
st+ship_out_cost 
231. Operating__expenses = 
admin__expenses+electricity+tax_&_bureacr
acy_compliance 
232. Personnel_cost = 
work_force*(WFU_cost+WFU_SS) 
233. Net_Profit = (invoiced_sales-
Interest__expenses-Taxation-
Operating__expenses-Personnel_cost-
product__direct_cost) 
234. profits_stock_1(t) = profits_stock_1(t - dt) + 
(Net_profit_acc_1) * dt 
235. INIT profits_stock_1 = 1 
236. INFLOWS: 
237. Net_profit_acc_1 = Net_Profit 
238. profits_stock_2(t) = profits_stock_2(t - dt) + 
(Net_profits_acc_2) * dt 
239. INIT profits_stock_2 = 1 
240. INFLOWS: 
241. Net_profits_acc_2 = Net_Profit_2 
242. property_&__plants_2(t) = 
property_&__plants_2(t - dt) + 
(P&P_invest_2) * dt 
243. INIT property_&__plants_2 = 3000000 
244. INFLOWS: 
245. P&P_invest_2 = IF (acc_for_P&P_2>50000) 
THEN 
(acc_for_P&P_2/(authorization_time_2+buil
ding_time_2)) ELSE 0 
246. property__&_plants(t) = 
property__&_plants(t - dt) + (P&P_invest) * 
dt 
247. INIT property__&_plants = 3000000 
248. INFLOWS: 
249. P&P_invest = IF (acc_for_P&P>50000) 
THEN 
(acc_for_P&P/(authorization_time+building_
time)) ELSE 0 
250. RM_inventory(t) = RM_inventory(t - dt) + 
(RM__order_rate - RM__usage_rate) * dt 
251. INIT RM_inventory = 150000 
252. INFLOWS: 
253. RM__order_rate = DELAY((des_inventory-
RM_inventory),receiv_time,receiv_time) 
254. OUTFLOWS: 
255. RM__usage_rate = 
production_rate*RM_per_unit 
256. RM_inventory_2(t) = RM_inventory_2(t - dt) 
+ (RM__order_rate_2 - RM__usage_rate_2) 
* dt 
257. INIT RM_inventory_2 = 150000 
258. INFLOWS: 
259. RM__order_rate_2 = 
DELAY((desir_inventory_2-
RM_inventory_2),receiv_time_2,receiv_time
_2) 
260. OUTFLOWS: 
261. RM__usage_rate_2 = 
production_rate_2*RM_per_unit_2 
262. State_1_receipts_from_SE(t) = 
State_1_receipts_from_SE(t - dt) + (tax_1) * 
dt 
263. INIT State_1_receipts_from_SE = 0 
264. INFLOWS: 
265. tax_1 = tax_payment*Stock_SE 
266. State_2_receipts_from_SE(t) = 
State_2_receipts_from_SE(t - dt) + (tax_2) * 
dt 
267. INIT State_2_receipts_from_SE = 0 
268. INFLOWS: 
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269. tax_2 = tax_payment_2*Stock_SE 
270. Stock_SE(t) = Stock_SE(t - dt) 
271. INIT Stock_SE = 223494 
272. Tax_liabilities(t) = Tax_liabilities(t - dt) + 
(Increase - tax_payment) * dt 
273. INIT Tax_liabilities = 0 
274. INFLOWS: 
275. Increase = Taxation 
276. OUTFLOWS: 
277. tax_payment = DELAY(IF(TTPT=0) THEN 
Tax_liabilities ELSE 0,26) 
278. Tax_liabilities_2(t) = Tax_liabilities_2(t - dt) 
+ (Increase_2 - tax_payment_2) * dt 
279. INIT Tax_liabilities_2 = 0 
280. INFLOWS: 
281. Increase_2 = Taxation_2 
282. OUTFLOWS: 
283. tax_payment_2 = DELAY(IF(TTPT_2=0) 
THEN Tax_liabilities_2 ELSE 0,26) 
284. adj_time = 4 
285. adj_time_2 = 4 
286. admin_delay = 8+2 
287. admin_delay_2 = 8 
288. admin_expenses_2 = 350000/52 
289. admin__expenses = 350000/52 
290. attraction__rate_2 = 0.002/52 
291. attract_rate = 0.003/52 
292. authorization_time = 156 
293. authorization_time_2 = 11.5 
294. av_time = 173 
295. av_time_2 = 39 
296. av_WFU_per_enterprise = 30 
297. building_time = 26 
298. building_time_2 = 26 
299. cash_fract = 0.1 
300. cash_fract_2 = 0.1 
301. contain_capacity = 4200 
302. contain_capacity_2 = 4200 
303. cost_per_km = driver_cost+fuel_cost+toll 
304. cost_per_km_2 = 
driver_cost_2+fuel_cost_2+toll_2 
305. decisional__time = MOD(TIME,52) 
306. decisional__time_2 = MOD(TIME,52) 
307. delay_in_perceiving_&shipment = 2 
308. delay_in_perceiving_&shipment_2 = 2 
309. Desired_cash = 100000 
310. Desired_cash_2 = 100000 
311. desired_product_inv = 100000 
312. desired_product_inv_2 = 100000 
313. desired__equipment_2 = 3000000 
314. desir_inventory_2 = 150000 
315. des_equip = 3000000 
316. des_inventory = 150000 
317. driver_cost = 0.20 
318. driver_cost_2 = 0.20 
319. efficiency_increase_2 = 
MAX(property_&__plants_2/initial_efficienc
y_2*0.99,1) 
320. efficiency__increase = 
MAX(property__&_plants/init_efficiency*0.
99,1) 
321. electricity = 
electr_cons/efficiency__increase*price_per_
MWh 
322. electricity_2 = 
electr_cons_2/efficiency_increase_2*price_p
er_MWh_2 
323. electr_cons = 2000/52 
324. electr_cons_2 = 2000/52 
325. equal_grants = 1000*6+900*2 
326. equip_inv_fraction = 0.15 
327. equip_inv_fraction_2 = 0.15 
328. Fraction_ant = 0.45 
329. Fraction_ant_2 = 0.25 
330. Fraction_cashed_on_time = 0.4 
331. Fraction_cashed_on_time_2 = 0.6 
332. fraction_disputes_2 = 0.15 
333. fract_decay = 0.1/52 
334. fract_decay_2 = 0.1/52 
335. fract_disputes = 0.15 
336. fuel_cost = 0.293 
337. fuel_cost_2 = +1.50/6 
338. gap = des_equip-equipments 
339. gap_2 = desired__equipment_2-equipment_2 
340. immediate_cash_fract = 0.3 
341. immediate_cash_fract_2 = 0.3 
342. IMU = 0.01 
343. IMU_2 = 0.005 
344. infrastructure's__quality&presence = 0.9 
345. infrastructure's__quality&presence_2 = 1 
346. initial_efficiency_2 = 3000000 
347. initial_quality = 500000 
348. initial_quality_2 = 500000 
349. init_efficiency = 3000000 
350. invR&Dfract_2 = 0.85 
351. invR&D_fract = 0.85 
352. inv_fraction = 0.5 
353. inv_fraction_2 = 0.5 
354. IRAP_rate = 0.039 
355. IRES_rate = 0.275 
356. IRES_rate_2 = 0.25 
357. km_TD = 
(987+241)/2/infrastructure's__quality&prese
nce 
358. km_TD_2 = 
(987+241)/2/infrastructure's__quality&prese
nce_2 
359. km_TR = 
241/infrastructure's__quality&presence 
360. km_TR_2 = 
241/infrastructure's__quality&presence_2 
361. losing_rate = 0.0045/52 
362. LT_debt_cost = 6.24/100/52 
363. LT_debt_cost_2 = 3.49/100/52 
364. mkt_demand = 2000000/52 
365. mkt_demand_2 = 2000000/52 
366. Normal_delay = 8 
367. Normal_delay_2 = 8 
368. Obs_time = 3.5*52 
369. Obs_time_2 = 3.5*52 
370. price_per_MWh = 192 
371. price_per_MWh_2 = 125 
372. price_per_unit = 
MAX(4*quality_increase*0.85,4*1) 
373. price_per_unit_2 = 
MAX(4*quality_increase_2*0.85,4*1) 
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374. products_per_work_unit = 
MAX(60000/52*efficiency__increase,60000/
52*1) 
375. products_per_work_unit_2 = 
MAX(60000/52*efficiency_increase_2,6000
0/52*1) 
376. prod_time_2 = 1 
377. prod_time_3 = 1 
378. PS1_PS2 = profits_stock_1/profits_stock_2 
379. quality_increase = 
MAX(Intangible_assets/initial_quality*0.70,
1) 
380. quality_increase_2 = 
MAX(Intangible_assets_2/initial_quality_2*
0.7,1) 
381. receiv_time = 3 
382. receiv_time_2 = 3 
383. redemption_time = 104 
384. redemption_time_2 = 104 
385. redempt_time = 26 
386. redempt_time_2 = 26 
387. remun_fraction = 0.4 
388. remun_fraction_2 = 0.4 
389. research_time = 52 
390. research_time_2 = 52 
391. RM_per_unit = 1 
392. RM_per_unit_2 = 1 
393. RM_unit_cost = 3.3 
394. RM_unit_cost_2 = 3.3 
395. ship_in_cost = 
(RM__order_rate/contain_capacity)*(cost_pe
r_km*km_TR) 
396. ship_in_cost_2 = 
(RM__order_rate_2/contain_capacity_2)*(co
st_per_km_2*km_TR_2) 
397. ship_out_cost = 
(shipment__rate/contain_capacity)*(cost_per
_km*km_TD) 
398. ship_out_cost_2 = 
(shipment__rate_2/contain_capacity_2)*(cost
_per_km_2*km_TD_2) 
399. ST_debt_cost = 4.86/100/52 
400. ST_debt_cost_2 = 2.56/100/52 
401. tax_&_bureacracy_compliance = 
weekly_cost*weeks 
402. tax_&_bureacracy_compliance_2 = 
weekly_cost_2*weeks_2 
403. toll = 0.136 
404. toll_2 = 0 
405. to_cash_fract = 0.7 
406. to_cash_fract_2 = 0.7 
407. TTP = 9 
408. TTPT = MOD(TIME,52) 
409. TTPT_2 = MOD(TIME,52) 
410. TTP_2 = 9 
411. TTR = 12 
412. TTR_2 = 12 
413. waiting_time = 12 
414. waiting_time_2 = 12 
415. weekly_cost = 1500 
416. weekly_cost_2 = 1500 
417. weeks = 17/52 
418. weeks_2 = 10/52 
419. WFU_cost = 1800/4 
420. WFU_cost_2 = 2100/4 
421. WFU_SS = 705/4 
422. WFU_SS_2 = 462/4 
423. work_force = 
mkt_demand/products_per_work_unit 
424. work_force_2 = 
mkt_demand_2/products_per_work_unit_2 
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